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Erie’s Suppressed Premise 
Michael Steven Green† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Some originalists believe that interpreting the Constitution 
with fidelity means following the Framers’ specific intent—that 
is, deciding constitutional questions as the Framers themselves 
would have if asked.1 For example, the death penalty cannot be 
judged to be cruel and unusual—and so contrary to the Eighth 
Amendment—unless the Framers would have said that the 
death penalty is cruel and unusual.  
But what if the Framers did not want judges to follow their 
specific intent?2 What if they wanted their intent to be followed 
only in the general sense that a judge interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment should do her best to identify what actually is 
cruel and unusual, whatever the Framers might have thought 
 
†  Robert E. & Elizabeth S. Scott Research Professor, College of William 
& Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. I would like to thank Larry Alexan-
der, Lea Brilmayer, Neal Devins, Scott Dodson, Larry Kramer, Kim Roosevelt, 
Steven D. Smith, and Bill Van Alstyne for helpful comments on various ver-
sions of this Article. Kevin Crennan provided valuable research assistance. 
Copyright © 2011 by Michael Steven Green. 
 1. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402–10 (2d ed. 1997) (advocating the 
interpretation of the Constitution on the basis of the Framers’ original inten-
tion ); Edwin Meese III, Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Asso-
ciation (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 1 (Paul G. Cassel ed., 1986). I ignore here further refinements 
of the originalist approach. For a short history of the evolution of originalism, 
see Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 923, 927–38 (2009). 
 2. E.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original In-
tent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985) (denying “intentionalism was the origi-
nal presupposition of American constitutional discourse”); Richard A. Posner, 
In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33.  
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about the matter?3 Would that mean that specific-intent origi-
nalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation is bankrupt? 
Not necessarily. There might be an argument for following 
the Framers’ specific intent even if they did not want their spe-
cific intent to be followed.4 Such an approach might be justified, 
for example, because it cabins the power of judicial review. If 
judges are allowed to exercise their own judgment about what 
types of punishment are cruel and unusual, they will have too 
much power to overturn the actions of the political branches of 
government. But if such an argument works,5 originalism 
would, in a sense, be turned on its head. Instead of being a doc-
trine devoted to following the Framers’ intent, it would funda-
mentally refuse to respect their intent.  
This Article is about a similar phenomenon in connection 
with the Erie doctrine.6 In the first year of law school, our civil 
procedure professors told us that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins7 overruled Swift v. Tyson.8 Under Swift, the common law 
was conceived of as a “brooding omnipresence”9 about which 
federal and state courts could come to differing judgments. Erie 
changed all that. A federal court could not come to its own con-
clusions about the common law in Pennsylvania.10 It had to de-
fer to the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.11  
Our civil procedure professors did not tell us, however, 
what a federal court should do if the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court did not want deference. What if it thought the common 
law in Pennsylvania was a matter about which federal courts 
could come to their own judgment? Why would the respect for 
state courts demanded by Erie not compel federal courts, para-
doxically, to adopt Swift concerning Pennsylvania common law?  
 
 3. On the distinction between specific and general intent in constitution-
al interpretation, see David O. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and 
Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 121–24 (1988). 
 4. E.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 (1999) 
(“Originalism neither depends on the interpretive intent of the founders nor 
employs that intent.”). 
 5. I take no stand on whether it does. 
 6. I thank Neal Devins for recognizing the analogy with originalism. 
 7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 8. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 9. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 10. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80. 
 11. See id. at 80 (following Falchetti v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 307 Pa. 203 
(1932)).  
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This is not a purely theoretical worry. At the time that 
Swift was decided, most state courts had their own Swiftian 
conception of the common law.12 If they entertained a common-
law action arising in a sister state, they came to their own con-
clusions about what the common law in the sister state was, 
without deferring to the sister state’s courts.13 This suggests 
that they conceived of their own common law as something 
about which sister-state and federal courts could come to an in-
dependent judgment. Furthermore, even when Erie was de-
cided in 1938, some states remained committed to this Swiftian 
view of the common law. Indeed, at least one state—Georgia—
appears to still understand the common law in Swiftian 
terms.14  
By claiming that state decisions bind a federal court, with-
out considering state court views on the matter, Justice Bran-
deis’s opinion in Erie appears to violate his own command to 
respect the authority of state courts concerning state law. If we 
are to save Brandeis’s argument, Erie must be turned on its 
head. A premise must be added that limits state courts’ power 
to determine the binding effect of their decisions. My goal is to 
make this suppressed premise in Brandeis’s argument explicit 
and to explore its effects. 
I begin by describing in greater detail the gap in Brandeis’s 
argument.15 In particular, I will show that it cannot be filled by 
Erie’s positivist mandate that all law—including the common 
law—“does not exist without some definite authority behind 
it.”16 Positivism is compatible with the Swiftian notion that a 
state’s common-law standards are a factual question about 
which the courts of other sovereigns, including federal courts, 
may come to their own judgment.17 
In the light of positivism’s failure to explain Brandeis’s 
conclusion in Erie, I offer what I believe is the suppressed 
premise in his argument—namely, a constitutionally mandated 
nondiscrimination principle.18 A state supreme court may not 
free federal courts of the duty to follow its decisions concerning 
 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 89–90. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. 
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)).  
 17. See infra note 105. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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state law unless it is willing to free its own courts of the same 
duty. It may not vary the binding effect of its decisions depend-
ing on whether the effect is in a domestic or a federal court. 
Since the Georgia Supreme Court takes its common-law deci-
sions to bind Georgia state courts, they must bind federal 
courts as well.19 I also argue that there is an analogous hori-
zontal nondiscrimination principle, derivable from the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, that prohibits state supreme courts 
from varying the binding effect of their decisions depending on 
whether the effect is in a domestic or a sister-state court. 
I then explore the suppressed premise in Brandeis’s argu-
ment in connection with the predictive method—that is, the 
view that a federal court interpreting unsettled state law must 
predict how the state supreme court would decide.20 The Su-
preme Court has suggested that the predictive method follows 
from the deference to state supreme courts demanded by Erie.21 
But here, too, we encounter our puzzle. The Supreme Court has 
imposed an interpretive method on federal courts without con-
sidering what the state supreme court thinks about the matter. 
What if the state supreme court does not care whether federal 
courts use the predictive method in deciding unsettled ques-
tions of its law?  
Once again, this is not a purely theoretical problem. The 
courts of some states—such as New York—do not use the pre-
dictive method when interpreting the unsettled law of sister 
states.22 New York courts simply presume that unsettled sister-
state law is the same as New York law, without trying to pre-
dict how the sister-state supreme court would decide.23 This 
suggests that the New York Court of Appeals does not think 
that unsettled questions of New York law must be decided by 
federal (or sister-state) courts according to the predictive meth-
od. If that is so, why has the Supreme Court claimed that the 
predictive method is constitutionally mandated? How can it tell 
the New York Court of Appeals how unsettled questions of New 
York law must be decided? The solution to this puzzle, I argue, 
is the vertical nondiscrimination principle latent in Erie. The 
New York Court of Appeals may not free federal courts of their 
duty to interpret unsettled New York law according to the pre-
 
 19. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.  
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.  
 22. See infra notes 179–84 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.  
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dictive method, except by changing (dramatically) the way such 
law is interpreted in New York state courts. 
I end by briefly describing the effect of the nondiscrimina-
tion principles in Erie and the Full Faith and Credit Clause on 
horizontal (state-state) choice of law.24 A growing number of 
scholars have recommended that choice-of-law principles be re-
formed in the light of Erie.25 If the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has decided that Pennsylvania law does not apply to cer-
tain interstate facts, federal and sister-state courts must take 
its decision as binding. But here, too, our puzzle arises. What if 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not think its choice-of-
law decisions bind federal or sister-state courts?26 What if it 
understands the territorial scope of Pennsylvania law in Swift-
ian terms, as a matter about which federal and sister-state 
courts may come to their own judgment? And here, too, the 
problem is not purely theoretical. Under every choice-of-law 
approach currently in use, the choice-of-law decisions of a sister 
state are ignored when determining whether sister-state law 
applies.27 This suggests that every state supreme court thinks 
that its own choice-of-law decisions can be ignored by sister-
state and federal courts.  
Nondiscrimination explains how deference to a state su-
preme court’s choice-of-law decisions can be justified even when 
such deference is contrary to its wishes. Since the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court takes its choice-of-law decisions to bind lower 
Pennsylvania state courts, they must be binding throughout 
the American legal system. 
I.  THE PUZZLE   
A. SWIFT AND ERIE 
In 1836, George Tysen purchased land in Maine from Na-
thaniel Norton and Jairus Keith.28 To secure payment for the 
land, Norton and Keith drew up in Maine a bill of exchange of 
 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 211–15. 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 204–10. 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 206–10. 
 28. Tyson’s name was actually Tysen. It was misspelled in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 
201, 204 n.20 (1982) (reviewing TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE 
SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981)). When referring to Mr. 
Tysen himself, I’ll use his correct name. When referring to the Supreme Court 
case, I’ll use the spelling that occurred in the Court’s opinion. 
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$1,540.30, payable six months later to Norton or his endorsee.29 
Tysen accepted the bill in New York.30 Norton then endorsed 
the bill to John Swift in partial satisfaction of a debt that Nor-
ton and Keith owed to Swift in connection with a previous pur-
chase of land.31  
As it turned out, Tysen had been duped. Norton and Keith 
did not own the land (which was worthless swamp anyway).32 
When Swift sought to collect on the bill at maturity, Tysen re-
fused to pay, on the grounds that Norton and Keith had fraudu-
lently induced him to accept.33 Swift then sued Tysen to enforce 
the bill in federal court in the Southern District of New York 
under diversity jurisdiction.34 
It was agreed that Swift took the bill without any know-
ledge of Norton and Keith’s fraud.35 Accordingly, if he was a 
bona fide purchaser of the bill for valid consideration, he should 
be entitled to enforce it against Tysen.36 The question was 
whether Swift’s promise to discharge a preexisting debt to Nor-
ton and Keith was valid consideration.37 Tysen argued that, ac-
cording to New York common law, it was not.38  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Story, held 
that the matter was one of “general commercial law”39 that 
could be decided by a federal court without deference to New 
York decisions. Standing in the way of such a conclusion, how-
ever, was section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This section, 
also known as the Rules of Decision Act, stated that “[t]he laws 
of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or 
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, 
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in 
 
 29. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 14–15 (1842). 
 30. Id. at 14. 
 31. Id. at 14–15. For a detailed account of the case, see FREYER, supra 
note 28, at 4–17. 
 32. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 15. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Swift was a citizen of Maine and Tysen was a citizen of New York. 
 35. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 14–15. 
 36. Id. at 15. 
 37. See id. at 16 (“[I]t is further contended, that . . . a pre-existing debt 
does not constitute . . . consideration.”). 
 38. If a state’s decisional law were applicable, the relevant state would be 
New York, since under the choice-of-law rules assumed by the Supreme Court, 
the law of the state where the bill was accepted applied. Id.  
 39. Id. at 18. 
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the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”40 It 
would appear, therefore, that the Act would compel a federal 
court to apply the “laws of the several states”—in particular 
New York common law—to the facts. 
Story admitted that the Act required federal courts sitting 
in diversity to abide by any relevant state statutes.41 Further-
more, they were bound by state court decisions concerning local 
usages, that is, common law concerning things “immovable and 
intraterritorial in their nature and character.”42 But the Act did 
not apply “to questions of a more general nature . . . as, for ex-
ample, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other writ-
ten instruments, and especially to questions of general com-
mercial law.”43 If the common-law matter was general rather 
than local, federal and state courts could each come to their 
own judgment about the common law’s content.44 
Almost a century later, a federal court in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York entertained another diversity action that was 
to end the Swift regime.45 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins con-
cerned an accident in Pennsylvania, in which Harry Tompkins 
was hit by something protruding from a passing train operated 
by the Erie Railroad Company.46 Tompkins sued Erie for negli-
gence in federal court in New York, relying on diversity subject-
matter jurisdiction.47 Since Tompkins was a trespasser on 
Erie’s property when the accident occurred, an important ques-
tion was Erie’s common law standard of care.48 
 
 40. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1652 (2006)). When the Act was amended in 1948, “trials at common law” 
was changed to “civil actions” to make it clear that the Act applied to actions 
at equity. 28 U.S.C. § 1652. 
 41. See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.  
 42. Id. at 18. 
 43. Id. at 18–19. 
 44. See id. at 19 (“[T]he decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects 
are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of 
this court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by 
which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed.”). 
 45. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 46. Id. at 69.  
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). Tompkins was a Pennsylvania citizen. Erie 
was considered a New York citizen by virtue of being incorporated in that 
state. This was prior to the amendment of the diversity statute in 1958 to 
treat a corporation as a citizen of its state (or states) of incorporation and the 
state “where it has its principal place of business.” Id. § 1332(c)(1). 
 48. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. 
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Both Erie’s and Tompkins’s arguments relied upon Swift’s 
distinction between local and general common law. Erie argued 
that the question was local and pointed to decisions of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding that it could be found li-
able only if it acted with wanton or willful negligence.49 Tomp-
kins argued that the question was general, allowing the court 
to come to its own decision about Erie’s standard of care.50 
Tompkins had a point: there was a long line of federal cases 
holding that a railroad’s common-law duty of care to its pas-
sengers and employees was general, as one might expect given 
the interstate character of train travel.51 On the other hand, 
Tompkins was neither a passenger nor an employee—indeed, 
he wasn’t on a train at all when the accident occurred, so the 
case was difficult to characterize.  
The trial court treated the matter as general and chose a 
simple negligence standard, and the Second Circuit affirmed.52 
But the Supreme Court reversed, choosing to overrule Swift, 
even though the issue had not been briefed by the parties.53  
Part of Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie pointed to the 
practical disadvantages of the Swift regime.54 Since states re-
fused to follow federal courts’ lead concerning the content of the 
general common law, two common-law standards could be ap-
plied to any transaction, depending upon whether enforcement 
was sought in federal or state court.55 What is more, the advan-
tage of having the choice between these two standards was 
granted in a discriminatory fashion.56 If the plaintiff was from 
a different state than the defendant, she could choose between 
these two standards by choosing between a state and a federal 
forum. But a plaintiff from the same state as the defendant was 
 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370 (1893) 
(holding that the applicability of the fellow-servant rule to a railroad was a 
matter of general common law); Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 
106–07 (1893) (holding that a passenger’s right to punitive damages against a 
railroad was a matter of general common law). 
 52. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937). 
 53. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 82 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“No constitutional 
question was suggested or argued below or here.”). 
 54. Id. at 74–78 (noting that the application of Swift “had revealed its 
defects”). 
 55. See id. at 74 (“Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on 
questions of common law prevented uniformity.”). 
 56. See id. (“Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens 
against citizens.”).  
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stuck with the common law as interpreted by the state court.57 
The incentive to forum shop was great, often so great that a 
plaintiff might change her citizenship solely to take advantage 
of diversity jurisdiction.58  
Another part of Brandeis’s opinion argued that the term 
“laws of the several states” in the Rules of Decision Act was in-
tended to include the general common law.59 So understood, 
Erie was merely about statutory interpretation.  
But Brandeis took his reading of the Act to be compelled by 
two more fundamental considerations. The first was jurispru-
dential. He rejected Swift’s conception of the general common 
law as “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular 
State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by stat-
ute.”60 Law, he argued, including the common law, exists only 
as the creation of some definite authority. It followed that the 
common law to be applied in Erie was either federal common 
law, rather than the brooding omnipresence in Swift, or the 
common law of a state. It is at this point that constitutional 
considerations came into play. Federal courts had no power, 
Brandeis argued, to create common law governing the transac-
tion in Erie.61 In particular, a grant of lawmaking power could 
not be found in the decision to give them jurisdiction over di-
versity cases.62 As a result, the federal court in Erie was consti-
 
 57. Or if the party making the choice was the defendant deciding whether 
to remove from state court, only defendants who were from a different state 
than the plaintiff had this option. At the time Erie was decided, a defendant 
diverse from a plaintiff could remove under diversity even if the defendant 
was a citizen of the state where the action was originally filed. This is no long-
er permitted. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).  
 58. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 (discussing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer 
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), in which a 
taxi company chose to reincorporate in Tennessee for diversity purposes). 
 59. See id. at 72–73. In arguing that Congress intended the Act to cover 
general common law, Brandeis relied heavily upon Charles Warren, New Light 
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). 
Warren’s reading of the Act has subsequently been questioned. See JULIUS 
GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 502–03 (1971); William A. Fletch-
er, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The 
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984). 
 60. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).  
 61. Id. at 78 (“[N]o clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a 
power [to create common law] upon the federal courts.”).  
 62. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) 
(stating that a principle of Erie is that the constitutional grant of diversity ju-
risdiction does not give federal courts the power to develop a “concomitant 
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tutionally obligated to apply state common law, as decided by 
the state’s courts.63  
Notice that Erie held that a federal court does not have 
lawmaking power by virtue of having subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.64 That does not mean that it cannot have lawmaking pow-
 
body of general federal law”); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The 
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 915–23 (1986); Paul J. 
Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the 
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 798–
99 (1957); Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It 
Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 245, 247–48 (2008). 
 63. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–79. Brandeis appeared to assume that the only 
common law available was Pennsylvania’s. He did not consider a federal 
court’s Erie obligations when two or more states’ laws (for example, the laws of 
Pennsylvania and New York) could permissibly be applied. For a discussion of 
some puzzles that arise when a federal court may permissibly choose between 
two states’ laws, see Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presump-
tion of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 64. In fact, even this principle must be qualified, for the grant of jurisdic-
tion will give federal courts some power to create procedural common law, un-
derstood as common law that regulates the means by which substantive rights 
are litigated in a court system. Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 91–92 (Reed, J., concur-
ring) (“The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one 
doubts federal power over procedure.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Com-
mon Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 846–52 (2008) (discussing the sources of federal 
court’s authority over their own procedure). On the scope of this constitutional 
power, see infra text accompanying notes 168–75.  
But there is another Erie doctrine of nonconstitutional origin that limits 
federal courts’ power to create federal procedural common law. Federal courts 
are constrained by a “policy,” Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), 
that recommends uniformity between federal procedural common law and the 
procedural law of the state where the federal court is located, if this is needed 
to discourage vertical forum shopping and to avoid the inequitable administra-
tion of the laws. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466–69 (1965). The bulk of the 
cases described as Erie problems by federal courts, as well as the bulk of the 
Erie cases read in a first-year civil procedure course, concern this nonconstitu-
tional question. E.g., Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 
504 (2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426–31 (1996); 
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 534–38 (1958); Cohen 
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–56 (1949); Woods v. Inter-
state Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & 
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949); Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109.  
To make matters worse, there is yet another “Erie” doctrine that concerns 
the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are not subject to 
the same limitations as federal procedural common law. The validity of a Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure depends upon two considerations: whether it is 
within Congress’s power to regulate the procedure of federal courts, and whether 
it satisfies the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), 
in which Congress delegated its regulatory power to the Supreme Court. Han-
na, 380 U.S. at 469–74. For a recent discussion, see Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442–44 (2010). 
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er for other reasons. Federal courts not only create interstitial 
common law when required to fill in gaps in federal statutes,65 
they sometimes create federal common law without any clear 
statutory authorization. Some examples are cases involving the 
rights and obligations of the United States66 and international 
relations.67  
This federal common law is arguably compatible with Erie, 
since it satisfies the requirements in Brandeis’s opinion. It is 
federal common law, not general common law of the Swiftian 
variety, because it is the self-avowed creation of federal courts 
and is binding upon state courts through the Supremacy 
Clause.68 But federal courts have the power to create this com-
mon law not because of federal jurisdiction, but instead because 
of sufficient “federal interests.”69 
B. WHAT IF STATE COURTS DON’T WANT YOU TO FOLLOW THEIR 
DECISIONS? 
To modern eyes, Swift looks like federal encroachment 
upon New York courts’ lawmaking powers. But it did not ap-
pear that way at the time. The reason is not merely that Jus-
tice Story’s opinion simply restated what was already an estab-
lished practice in federal courts, which had a history of deciding 
general common-law cases without deference to state deci-
sions.70 More importantly, this practice probably did not usurp 
powers that New York courts were claiming for themselves. As 
Story noted, they would also have treated the issue in Swift as 
a question of general common law: “It is observable that the 
 
 65. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253–57 (1978).  
 66. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). 
 67. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426–27 (1964). 
For further discussion of the federal interests found sufficient to create federal 
common law, see Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Com-
mon Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 630–44 (2006). 
 68. I will not discuss here the scope of federal courts’ power to make sub-
stantive common law. Some examples of the enormous literature on this topic 
are Field, supra note 62; Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal 
Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985); Martin H. Redish, Fed-
eral Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “In-
stitutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989); Louise Weinberg, 
Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989).  
 69. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).  
 70. FREYER, supra note 28, at 17–43; Fletcher, supra note 59, at 1516–21; 
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
1231, 1265 (1985) (“Long before Swift v. Tyson was decided, federal courts rec-
ognized the division between general and local law . . . .”). 
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Courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this point 
upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient local usage: 
but they deduce the doctrine from the general principles of 
commercial law.”71 New York state courts, he suggested, did 
not consider their own decisions about the general principles of 
commercial law to be binding upon federal courts.72 
I think that Justice Story was probably right. The best evi-
dence is the way that New York state courts would have adju-
dicated events in sister states. At the time that Swift was de-
cided, most state courts followed the decisions of sister-state 
courts only concerning local usages and the interpretations of 
sister-state statutes. If the matter concerned the general com-
mon law—such as commercial law or the law merchant73—they 
would opine about this law without any special deference to 
what the sister state’s courts had said.74  
Granted, if one looks to cases around the time Swift was 
decided, it is hard to find an example of a state court explicitly 
refusing to abide by a sister-state decision concerning the gen-
eral common law. But this is because it was so hard for state 
courts to get information about the decisional (or, indeed, stat-
utory) law of sister states.75 Lacking such information, they 
rarely knew whether they were contradicting a sister-state de-
 
 71. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
 72. See id. at 16–19.  
 73. I speak of the law merchant as common law, although they originally 
had different sources. For the story of how the law merchant became part of 
the common law, a process in which Justice Story played a role, see Charles A. 
Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The 
Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 352–67 
(1983). 
 74. See Crisson v. Williamson, 8 Ky. (1 A.K. Marsh.) 454, 455–56 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1819); Bradford v. Cooper, 1 La. Ann. 325, 326 (1846) (“It is a fact of 
which we deem it to be our duty to take judicial notice, that the law-merchant 
prevails throughout the States of this Union, except so far as the same may be 
modified in particular States by statute.”); Brown v. Ferguson, 31 Va. (4 
Leigh) 37, 42–44 (1832). I have not been able to find clear evidence from New 
York courts themselves at the time that Swift was decided, but evidence can 
be found in later cases. See St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat’l Bank, 27 N.E. 
849, 851 (N.Y. 1891); Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N.Y. 413, 418–19 (1880).  
Tony Freyer claims that New York rejected Swift in Stalker v. M’Donald, 
6 Hill 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). FREYER, supra note 28, at 46. In fact, all that 
Stalker did was refuse to respect Swift’s conclusion about the relevant general 
common-law standard. That is entirely compatible with its accepting Swift’s 
position that the general common-law standard exists independently of the 
decisions of state or federal courts. See Stalker, 6 Hill at 95. 
 75. Weinberg, supra note 68, at 822–23. 
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cision. But the fact remains that they did not care whether they 
were.76  
Evidence that state courts were committed to the general 
common law is even stronger after Swift was decided, since 
many state courts, citing Swift, adopted their own horizontal 
version of the doctrine—stating unambiguously that if a gener-
al common-law issue arose concerning an event in a sister 
state, they could decide the matter without deference to the de-
cisions of the sister state’s courts.77  
Such cases provide critical evidence of how these state 
courts believed their own decisions should be treated by sister-
state (and federal) courts. An example is Slaton v. Hall, decided 
only nine years before Erie, in which the Georgia Supreme 
Court reaffirmed its commitment to Swift:  
The common law is presumed to be the same in all the American 
states where it prevails. Though courts in the different states may 
place a different construction upon a principle of common law, that 
does not change the law. There is still only one right construction. If 
all the American states were to construe the same principle of com-
mon law incorrectly, the common law would be unchanged.78 
Because Slaton concerned an accident in Alabama, strictly 
speaking it held only that Alabama decisions could be ignored 
when interpreting the common law in Alabama. But its reason-
ing clearly applies to the common law in Georgia as well. The 
Georgia Supreme Court must think that its own decisions can 
be ignored by sister-state courts when they interpret the com-
mon law in Georgia.  
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Pattillo v. Alexander, 105 Ga. 482, 482 (1898); Franklin v. Twogood, 
25 Iowa 520, 531 (1868); Roads v. Webb, 91 Me. 406, 412–13 (1898); Fellows v. 
Harris, 20 Miss. (12 S. & M.) 462, 466–67 (1849); St. Nicholas Bank, 27 N.E. 
at 851–52; Faulkner, 82 N.Y. at 418–19; Third Nat’l Bank of Springfield v. 
Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 139 S.W. 665, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Alfred Hill, 
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 598 (1958). 
This Swiftian approach to the common law should be distinguished from state 
courts’ use of a rebuttable presumption that the law of a sister state is the 
same as the forum’s. In the absence of evidence of the sister state’s law, a state 
court employing the rebuttable presumption might apply even its statutory 
law to the sister state. But this presumption would yield to concrete evidence 
of the sister state’s law. For a discussion of this presumption, see Green, supra 
note 63, at pt. III.A. In contrast, under the Swiftian approach, if the sister 
state’s common law was at issue, the court would refuse to defer even to con-
crete evidence of the decisions of the sister state’s courts provided by the par-
ties. See, e.g., Pattillo, 105 Ga. at 482. 
 78. Slaton v. Hall, 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929). 
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It is likely, therefore, that New York state courts thought 
that their decisions about the common law in New York could 
be ignored by federal courts, since they would have ignored the 
decisions of a sister state’s courts when interpreting the com-
mon law in the sister state.79 Story was treating the question in 
Swift the way New York state courts wanted it to be treated. 
Indeed, it is tempting to argue that Swift was compatible with 
Erie, in the sense that Swift satisfied Brandeis’s demand that 
federal courts respect state decisions concerning state law. Af-
ter all, New York decisions were given exactly the effect in fed-
eral court that their creators intended them to have. Under 
such a reading, the decision in Erie became necessary, not be-
cause the Supreme Court suddenly realized that it should re-
spect state decisions, but because state courts began to under-
stand their decisions as binding on federal (and sister-state) 
courts. Constitutional law did not change. State law did. Such 
an interpretation has recently been offered by Bradford Clark:  
So long as state courts saw themselves as ascertaining and applying a 
general body of law reflected by the decisions of multiple jurisdictions, 
federal courts sitting in diversity were free to do the same. It was only 
after states abandoned this approach in favor of state-specific rules 
that the federal courts’ persistence in applying general commercial 
law in diversity cases triggered serious constitutional concerns.80 
But there is a problem with Clark’s interpretation. At the 
time Swift was decided, not every state shared Story’s concep-
tion of the general common law. Even with respect to questions 
of commercial law of the sort at issue in Swift, Connecticut ap-
peared to treat the common law applicable in a sister state as 
constituted by the decisions of the sister state’s courts, suggest-
ing that it thought the same about the common law in Connect-
icut.81 If Story had been truly sensitive to state courts’ views 
about the binding effect of their decisions, he would have made 
an exception in Swift for Connecticut.  
Furthermore, in the years between Swift and Erie other 
states rejected the general common law in more pointed terms. 
In Forepaugh v. Delaware Railroad,82 the Pennsylvania Su-
 
 79. See supra note 74. 
 80. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 708 (2008); see also Brad-
ford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1292–94 
(2007) [hereinafter Clark, Constitutional]; Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common 
Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1276–92 (1996). 
 81. Roe v. Jerome, 18 Conn. 138, 158–60 (1846); Brush v. Scribner, 11 
Conn. 388, 407 (1836).  
 82. 128 Pa. 217 (1889). 
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preme Court was asked to interpret the common law applying 
to a contract entered into in New York. The plaintiff argued 
that because the question concerned commercial law, New York 
decisions could be ignored. Justice Mitchell’s response was 
scathing: 
It is not probable that the doctrine [of the general common law] would 
ever have got a foothold in jurisprudence, and it would certainly have 
been long ago abandoned, had it not been for the unfortunate misstep 
that was made in the opinion in Swift v. Tyson. . . . Since then the 
courts of the United States have persisted in the recognition of a 
mythical commercial law, and have professed to decide so-called 
commercial questions by it, in entire disregard of the law of the state 
where the question arose.83 
Although the narrow holding in Forepaugh was that Pennsyl-
vania courts should defer to New York decisions concerning the 
common law in New York, it spoke in general terms of the 
common law of all states, including Pennsylvania.84 According 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, its decisions concerning 
the common law in Pennsylvania are binding everywhere. And 
yet after 1889 (the year Forepaugh was decided), federal courts 
made no exception to the rule in Swift for Pennsylvania com-
mon law. They applied Swift to the common law of all states.85  
Indeed, Clark appears to have things exactly backwards. 
Instead of coming to the happy conclusion that both Swift and 
Erie respected state courts’ views about the binding effect of 
their decisions, we should instead be worrying that neither did. 
Like Swift, Erie answered the question of whether state court 
decisions are binding categorically, rather than on a state-by-
state basis. Under Erie, a federal court deciding a common-law 
case arising in Georgia is bound by the decisions of the Georgia 
Supreme Court, even though the Georgia Supreme Court does 
not want the federal court to be bound. In taking this categori-
cal stance, Brandeis’s argument in Erie appears to violate his 
own command to respect state courts on matters of state law.86  
One solution to this puzzle is to bite the bullet and con-
clude that Brandeis was wrong to take a categorical approach. 
The binding effect of state courts’ common-law decisions should 
be answered by reference to state law. Indeed, the state-law so-
 
 83. Id. at 228–29. 
 84. Id. at 227 (“The law of Pennsylvania consists of . . . the common law, 
not of any or all other countries, but of Pennsylvania.”). 
 85. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.  
 86. One person who has recognized this problem is Michael Dorf. See Mi-
chael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 709 
(1995). For further discussion of Dorf ’s article, see infra note 178.  
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lution is suggested in Justice Holmes’s dissent in Black & 
White Taxicab & Transfer Co.: 
If a state constitution should declare that on all matters of general 
law the decisions of the highest Court should establish the law until 
modified by statute or by a later decision of the same Court, I do not 
perceive how it would be possible for a Court of the United States to 
refuse to follow what the State Court decided in that domain. But 
when the constitution of a State establishes a Supreme Court it by 
implication does make that declaration as clearly as if it had said it in 
express words, so far as it is not interfered with by the superior power 
of the United States. The Supreme Court of a State does something 
more than make a scientific inquiry into a fact outside of and inde-
pendent of it. It says, with an authority that no one denies, except 
when a citizen of another State is able to invoke an exceptional juris-
diction, that thus the law is and shall be.87 
Holmes assumed that under each state’s law, the decisions of 
the state’s supreme court are binding upon federal courts. This 
was a reasonable assumption, but with respect to states like 
Georgia it was false. Had he recognized this, Holmes would ap-
parently have agreed that a federal court deciding Georgia 
common law should come to its own conclusion about what this 
law is. 
One might think that adoption of the state-law solution 
would make little practical difference now. Haven’t all states 
given up the Swiftian view of the common law? The truth, as 
strange as it may sound, is that Slaton v. Hall is still good law 
in Georgia. Georgia state courts still conceive of the common 
law in Swiftian terms. Although they will apply a sister state’s 
statute to events in the sister state and respect how its courts 
have interpreted the statute,88 if the matter is governed by the 
common law (including apparently local common law), they 
come to their own judgment about what this common law is.89 
 
 87. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & 
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 534–35 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 88. E.g., Calhoun v. Cullum’s Lumber Mill, Inc., 545 S.E.2d 41, 44–45 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001). 
 89. E.g., Trs. of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp. v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807, 811 
(1940); Calhoun, 545 S.E.2d at 45; Leavell v. Bank of Commerce, 314 S.E.2d 
678, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); see also John B. Rees, Jr., Choice of Law in Geor-
gia: Time to Consider a Change?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 787, 789–90 (1983); 
Weinberg, supra note 70, at 821 n.85. One might read these cases as simply 
applying Georgia common law to events in sister states. Rather than conceiv-
ing of the common-law standard as transcending the decisions of any state, 
Georgia would instead have an imperialist conception of its common-law stand-
ard as applying in all sister states. A few cases do put the matter this way. 
E.g., White v. Borders, 123 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (“[T]he com-
mon law of Georgia rather than that of Tennessee will control in an action 
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This suggests that they do not think that their own common-
law decisions bind sister-state—or federal—courts. According 
to the state-law solution, a federal court deciding a common-
law case arising in Georgia should still exercise its own judg-
ment about what Georgia common law is.90  
C. POSITIVISM? 
To avoid the state-law solution, we need to add a premise 
to Brandeis’s argument in Erie—one that limits state courts’ 
power to control the binding effect of their decisions. The com-
mon-law decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court must bind 
federal courts even if it does not want them to.  
My guess is that most would argue that no premise needs 
to be added. It is already there in Erie’s positivist mandate—
that is, the view that law “does not exist without some definite 
authority behind it.”91 Legal positivism, in this sense, is the 
 
brought in Georgia courts even though the injury occurred in Tennessee.”). 
But this is an inaccurate description of Georgia’s approach. Under Georgia 
choice-of-law rules for tort, the lex loci delicti—the law of the place of the acci-
dent—applies. Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 418–19 (Ga. 2005); 
Bagnell v. Ford Motor Co., 678 S.E.2d 489, 492 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). If the ac-
cident occurs in a sister state, Georgia law cannot apply. The law applied must 
instead be the law of the place of the accident. But if the question is not cov-
ered by a statute of the sister state, Georgia courts will exercise their own 
judgment about what the common law applying in that sister state is. For ex-
ample, in Risdon Enterprises v. Colemill Enterprises, 324 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1984), the Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the lex loci delicti 
applied to a tort action concerning an airplane crash in South Carolina. Id. at 
740. But since the matter was not governed by a South Carolina statute, but 
by the common law, it insisted that it was “not bound by the interpretation 
placed upon the common law by the [South Carolina] courts.” Id. at 741. 
Because Georgia state courts use this Swiftian interpretive approach con-
cerning sister-state law, federal courts in Georgia feel themselves compelled un-
der Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), 
to do the same. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 n.6 
(11th Cir. 1987); In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 677 (N.D. 
Ga. 2003); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 
1343–44 (M.D. Ga. 1999). For a discussion, see Green, supra note 63, at pt. IV. 
 90. The state-law solution would have serious costs even if I am wrong 
about Georgia courts’ Swiftian view of the common law, or they abandon this 
view. The solution would also recommend looking to state law to decide how 
unsettled issues of state law should be interpreted. This threatens federal 
courts’ commitment to the predictive method, since the courts of some states 
do not think that their unsettled law must be interpreted according to this meth-
od. See infra Part III. The state-law solution would also have important conse-
quences for choice of law. See infra Part IV. 
 91. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & 
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 
U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Louise Weinberg has argued 
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view that the law in a jurisdiction is ultimately determined by 
the jurisdiction’s officials.92 In Slaton, the Georgia Supreme 
Court arguably treated the common law as a brooding omni-
presence that exists independently of its own or anyone else’s 
authority. It took the common law to be binding in Georgia the 
way that morality is binding in Georgia, that is, whether any 
authority recognizes it or not. Since this conception of the 
common law was rejected in Erie, federal courts may ignore 
Slaton and take the Georgia Supreme Court’s decisions as bind-
ing, whatever the Georgia Supreme Court itself might think of 
the matter.  
But positivism cannot be Erie’s suppressed premise, be-
cause the Swiftian view of the common law is compatible with 
positivism.93 A state supreme court can believe that the stand-
ard in the common law is binding domestically only because 
it—or some other appropriate state authority—says so, while 
insisting that the content of this standard is a question of fact, 
concerning which federal courts can come to their own judg-
ment. To see why this was the case, let’s begin with Larry Les-
sig’s positivist account of Swift.  
Lessig emphasizes that the common law at issue in Swift 
was the law merchant—understood as the custom of parties to 
 
that Erie’s positivism applies to state as well as to federal courts. Louise 
Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 523, 550–51 (2004). 
 92. Current philosophers of law generally identify legal positivism by 
means of two theses. According to the social fact thesis, the law of a jurisdic-
tion is fundamentally identified by social facts (largely concerning the officials 
in the jurisdiction). According to the separability thesis, the content of the law 
need not overlap with the content of morality, although it often does so as a 
contingent matter. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positiv-
ism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 
241 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
 93. Much of my argument in this section echoes Jack Goldsmith and Ste-
ven Walt’s excellent Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 673 (1998). Like me, Goldsmith and Walt argue that Swift was compati-
ble with positivism and thus that Erie’s conclusion that federal courts should 
defer to state courts concerning state law cannot be justified by positivism 
alone. But they understand this positivist Swift in one of two ways: Swift took 
Article III to authorize federal courts to make an independent judgment about 
the content of state law, or it concluded that federal courts have the power to 
enforce a national common law. E.g., id. at 695. see also Steven Walt, Before 
the Jurisprudential Turn: Corbin and the Mid-Century Opposition to Erie, 2 
Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 75, 126 (2010). Because they ignore states’ own horizontal 
version of Swift, they do not consider the possibility that federal courts were 
justified in making their own judgment about the common law in a state be-
cause the state’s courts wanted them to.  
  
2011] ERIE’S SUPPRESSED PREMISE 1129 
 
commercial transactions.94 Since commercial custom is a mat-
ter of fact, he argues that it was not odd that Story thought 
that courts of different sovereigns could exercise their own 
judgment about what the law merchant was. Each court was 
simply trying to discover the common understanding of the par-
ties to the contract being litigated. That a contract is entered 
into under New York law does not mean that the facts about 
the intentions of the parties to the contract cannot be decided 
by the courts (or juries) of another sovereign that has jurisdic-
tion of the case.95 
 
 94. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in 
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1790–91 (1997); see also 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1, *67 (stating that the common law 
is derived from “maxims and customs . . . of higher antiquity than memory or 
history can reach”). 
 95. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and 
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 427–28 (1995) (“Federal judges are as competent 
as state judges in this scientific search for facts.”). As I have described Lessig’s 
position, Story applied New York law in Swift. The federal court had the pow-
er to decide what the law merchant was only because New York authorities 
made commercial custom a relevant fact to the case. Some defenders of Swift 
did understand it as applying state law. Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 93, at 
682–85. But others saw the law merchant as a form of national law that feder-
al courts were authorized to enforce by virtue of the grant of federal jurisdic-
tion for diversity cases. Id. at 685 & n.51. Even this national law merchant was 
positivist, however, insofar as it was binding in the United States by virtue of 
its recognition by federal courts. Furthermore, federal courts understood the 
commercial custom recognized by the national law as a question of fact. State 
courts were free to come to their own conclusions about what commercial cus-
tom was. For example, in Stalker v. M’Donald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843), 
decided one year after Swift, a New York court again denied that a promise to 
discharge a preexisting debt was valid consideration when purchasing a bill of 
exchange, and thereby rejected the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Swift. 
The Supreme Court treated Stalker as a mere disagreement, not as a violation 
of the Supremacy Clause. Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 343 (1857). 
It might seem odd that the question of whether the law being enforced in 
Swift had its source in state or federal authority was left open. But nothing 
rode on answering the question. Under each interpretation commercial custom 
was to be enforced, and under each the courts of other sovereigns could come 
to their own judgment about what commercial custom was. 
It is understandable, therefore, that Lessig, like Clark, claims that Swift 
“created no affront to state sovereignty.” Lessig, supra note 95, at 428; see also 
Lessig, supra note 94, at 1788 (“[Swift] ratified a practice that was wholly un-
remarkable, both at the state and federal level.”). Either Swift applied New 
York law exactly the way New York courts wanted it to be applied, or it ap-
plied national law that came to exactly the same result that the application of 
New York law would have. But Swift created no affront to New York’s sover-
eignty. Like Clark, Lessig ignores the fact that even at the time Swift was de-
cided, Connecticut courts appeared to treat their decisions about the law mer-
chant in Connecticut as binding everywhere. See supra text accompanying 
note 81. Had he been concerned about respecting state courts’ views about the 
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Because the content of the law merchant was understood 
as a question of fact, Lessig believes that Story’s conception of 
the common law was positivist:  
Justice Story was speaking of the source of the common law, or more 
precisely, the source of its substance. He was not speaking of the 
source of its power. As any jurist from the time would have said, the 
power of the common law comes from its adoption, or recognition, by a 
domestic court.96 
This is precisely how we understand the matter to this day. Al-
though the customs that inform the mutual understandings of 
the parties to a New York contract are a question of fact about 
which federal or sister-state courts may make their own judg-
ment, neither the customs nor the mutual understandings on 
their own have the force of law. For that we need a legal au-
thority in New York that recognizes them.  
Lessig’s positivist reading of the law merchant is supported 
by a state legislature’s power to override the enforceability of 
the law merchant by statute. The New York legislature is able 
to make commercial custom in New York a legal nullity at will. 
To the extent that commercial custom is legally binding, it is 
only because the New York legislature permits it to be. 
One might question, however, why commercial custom was 
thought legally binding until overridden by statute. It is unlike-
ly, however, that this threshold legal enforceability was 
thought to have its source outside any legal authority. Other-
wise there would have been no reason for the thirteen colonies 
upon independence to enact statutes or constitutional provi-
sions receiving the common law.97 Later admitted states also 
adopted the common law through statutes or constitutional 
provisions.98 These efforts would have been unnecessary if the 
 
binding effect of their decisions, Story would have answered the question on a 
state-by-state basis. But he stated categorically that a state court’s decisions 
concerning the law merchant are not binding on a federal court. A federal 
court must treat the law merchant as fact even if the relevant state wants it 
treated as law. 
 96. Lessig, supra note 94, at 1790. 
 97. Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the 
United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 798–99 (1951). Most states did so almost 
immediately after independence. Two laggards were Rhode Island, which did 
not receive the common law until 1798, and Connecticut, which passed a re-
ception statute in 1818. ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN 
AMERICAN LAW: 1776–1836, at 24 (1964). For a discussion of the reception of 
the common law in the United States, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 132–37 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 98. Hall, supra note 97, at 801–05. Furthermore, to the extent that courts 
used common-law principles prior to the passage of a reception statute, they 
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common law were legally applicable without any authority in 
the state saying so.99 
The example of the law merchant is enough to show that 
positivism cannot explain Brandeis’s conclusion in Erie. Accord-
ing to Brandeis, a state supreme court’s common-law decisions 
are always binding on federal courts sitting in diversity. No ex-
ception is drawn for law merchant cases. Federal courts must 
treat the law merchant as law even if the relevant state su-
preme court wants it treated as fact.100 The reason cannot be 
Erie’s positivist mandate, for, as we have seen, conceiving of 
the law merchant as fact is compatible with positivism—and 
indeed states probably understood the law merchant positivis-
tically.  
But the gap in Brandeis’s argument extends beyond the 
law merchant to the expanded common law that arose later in 
the nineteenth century. According to Lessig, this new common 
law “was no longer reflective, or mirroring private understand-
ings; it had become directive, or normative over those private 
understandings.”101 It was understood as a special set of nor-
mative facts discoverable through a putative scientific meth-
od—normative facts applicable beyond contracts and commer-
cial law to areas where the common understanding of the 
 
made it clear that the principles were law by virtue of judicial decision. Id. at 
800; see also Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 163, 166 (Conn. 1805). 
 99. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1027 
(2002). To be sure, reception statutes spoke of adopting the common law of 
England. Georgia’s reception statute, for example, incorporated the “Common 
Laws of England, and such of the Statute Laws as were usually in force in 
[Georgia]” as of “the fourteenth day of May in the year of our Lord one thou-
sand seven hundred and seventy-six, so far as they are not contrary to the 
constitution, laws and form of government now established in this State.” See 
Act of Feb. 25, 1784, in 1 FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 290 (1981). 
But this identification of the common law with a particular sovereign only pro-
vides further evidence that the common law was understood positivistically.  
 100. Since state common law of commercial paper has been largely dis-
placed by the Uniform Commercial Code, and before that codified or incorpo-
rated by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Bane, supra note 73, at 
367–77, it is hard to find a truly common-law commercial paper case after 
Erie. But some common-law duties of banks not to honor checks have not been 
superseded by the U.C.C. In such cases, federal courts treat the law merchant 
in the state as law, without concern for whether the state wants it treated as 
fact. E.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 374 F.3d 
521, 526 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (applying Illinois common law); Fed. Ins. 
Co. v NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C., 958 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992) (apply-
ing Florida common law).  
 101. Lessig, supra note 94, at 1792. 
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parties is less relevant, such as torts. It was at this point, Les-
sig argues, that the common law became antipositivist: “The 
common law became, then, this self-sustaining body of norma-
tive authority, living through the articulations of the federal 
judiciary alone.”102  
Finally, in the twentieth century, this antipositivist gener-
al common law became increasingly suspect. Brandeis respond-
ed to the resurgent positivist vision of the common law in Erie 
by compelling federal courts to defer to state courts concerning 
the content of the common law in the state. Lessig agrees with 
the prevailing view, therefore, that the decision in Erie was a 
consequence of a positivist conception of the common law.103 
The problem with Lessig’s reading is that, like the law 
merchant, the normative common law can be understood posi-
tivistically.104 The distinction between the standard of the 
common law (understood as a question of fact) and the reason 
that this standard applies in the state (understood positivisti-
cally as resting in the decisions of the appropriate state author-
ities) is as applicable to the normative common law as it is to 
the law merchant. That a state supreme court insists that the 
standards in the common law are determined by normative 
facts over which it has no control—and concerning which the 
federal courts and the courts of sister states may exercise their 
own judgment—is compatible with its thinking that the reason 
that these standards legally apply in the state is because it or 
the state’s legislature said so.105  
The evidence that states did indeed understand the norma-
tive common law positivistically is the same evidence that they 
 
 102. Lessig, supra note 95, at 428. 
 103. Lessig, supra note 94, at 1793–94. 
 104. Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 93, at 693 (“[Lessig] does not explain 
how a theory of law embraced by all parties to the debate and not ostensibly 
central to it nonetheless played a dispositive causal role.”). 
 105. My argument here might appear to assume a form of inclusive legal 
positivism, that is, the view that moral norms can be incorporated into a juris-
diction’s law, provided that this incorporation occurs through the decisions of 
the appropriate legal authorities. Two contemporary inclusive legal positivists 
are Jules Coleman and Will Waluchow. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE 
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY (2001); W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994). Exclu-
sive legal positivists, in contrast, insist that the law’s “existence and content 
can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any eval-
uative argument.” JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE 
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 194–95 (1994). Although I believe that my 
argument is in fact compatible with exclusive legal positivism, I will not ad-
dress the matter here.  
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understood the law merchant positivistically. Like the law mer-
chant, the normative common law could be overridden by state 
statutes. The state legislature could make this body of norma-
tive facts a legal nullity within the state. To the extent that it 
was enforceable, therefore, it was only because state authori-
ties let it be. Furthermore, reception statutes were appealed to 
in normative common-law cases as well as law merchant cases, 
also suggesting that state courts conceived of the normative 
common law as legally binding within their borders only be-
cause of decisions of the relevant state authorities.106 
Indeed, if state courts truly thought that the normative 
common law existed in a jurisdiction independent of the juris-
diction’s authority, they would have applied it to all foreign ju-
risdictions. But they did not apply it to civil law jurisdictions,107 
including Louisiana,108 nor to jurisdictions that were neither 
common nor civil law, such as Indian tribes.109 This demon-
strates that state courts thought that the applicability of the 
normative common law in a jurisdiction was fundamentally 
answered by the decisions of authorities within that jurisdic-
tion, insofar as it depended upon their historical choice of what 
type of legal system to adopt.  
Because the normative common law was positivist, Erie’s 
positivist mandate had no effect on it. Those state supreme 
courts committed to this normative common law probably rec-
ognized that it was legally binding only because they or other 
appropriate state authorities said so. The question remained 
whether the standards in this common law were fact or law. 
And cases such as Slaton give us the answer. They were consid-
ered facts concerning which other courts could come to their 
own judgment. This may have been a bad idea, but it was not 
antipositivist.  
 
 106. E.g., Ector v. Grant, 37 S.E. 984, 985 (Ga. 1901) (appealing to the 
Georgia reception statute to answer the common-law question of intestate suc-
cession); see Act of Feb. 25, 1784, supra note 99, at 290.  
 107. E.g., Banco De Sonora v. Bankers’ Mut. Cas. Co., 100 N.W. 532 (Iowa 
1904) (Mexico); Savage v. O’Neil, 44 N.Y. 298, 300–03 (1871) (Russia); see also 
Albert Martin Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. REV. 401, 
402–04 (1906).  
 108. Int’l Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 99 N.E. 722, 727 (N.Y. 1912) (“In the 
absence of proof on the subject [such as a statute abrogating the common law], 
. . . the common law is presumed to prevail in all the states in which it is the 
foundation of their jurisprudence, such as New York and Pennsylvania, but 
not including those states which inherited or adopted the civil law, such as 
Louisiana.”). 
 109. Davison v. Gibson, 56 F. 443, 444–45 (8th Cir. 1893) (Creek Nation). 
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A positivist reading of the normative common law is not 
undermined by skepticism about whether normative facts exist 
in the same sense that facts about commercial custom do. 
There might be no such thing as a normative fact—or no such 
thing as a normative fact of the sort with which the general 
common law is concerned. Or, assuming that there are such 
facts, the way courts were supposed to identify them might be 
fundamentally misguided. None of this makes the normative 
common law any less positivist, nor does it license federal 
courts to take a state supreme court’s decisions concerning the 
normative common law as binding. 
As an analogy, imagine that the Georgia Supreme Court 
announces that, in an exercise of its lawmaking authority, the 
law of Georgia henceforth includes the moral code in the Bible. 
Imagine as well that it insists that because the content of the 
Bible is a question of fact, federal courts and the courts of sister 
states adjudicating events arising in Georgia should come to 
their own conclusion about what the Bible says. What follows if 
no coherent moral code can be drawn from the Bible? Not that 
the Georgia Supreme Court’s conception of Georgia law is anti-
positivist. There still is no doubt that the Bible is legally rele-
vant in Georgia only because the Georgia Supreme Court says 
so. Nor does it follow that Georgia law is what the Georgia Su-
preme Court says is in the Bible. The Georgia Supreme Court 
was clear that Georgia law is what is in fact in the Bible, not 
what it thinks is in the Bible. All that can be concluded from 
the inability to draw a rule of decision from the Bible is that 
the content of Georgia law is indeterminate.110  
Positivism cannot explain Brandeis’s conclusion that a 
state supreme court’s common-law decisions always bind feder-
al courts. As a result, Brandeis’s argument in Erie is still in 
 
 110. Even if one assumes that the common law articulated in Slaton is, for 
some reason, anti-positivist, it still would not follow from Erie’s positivist 
mandate that federal courts should follow Georgia decisions concerning the 
common law. All that positivism tells us is that the common law that Slaton 
spoke of does not exist. It cannot tell us what the Georgia Supreme Court will 
do in response. And since a positivist conception of the normative common law 
is possible, the Georgia Supreme Court might respond to Slaton’s demise by us-
ing its authority (authority it apparently thinks it should not have) to decree 
that the normative common law applies in Georgia and that the content of this 
common law is a question of fact. After all, this would be the best way to con-
tinue Slaton within the confines of Erie’s positivist mandate. It is clear, how-
ever, that Brandeis thought it unnecessary to predict the likely responses of 
state courts to the end of the general common law. He thought it simply followed 
from his argument that state courts’ decisions were binding on federal courts. 
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trouble. Indeed, the difficulty extends beyond a state’s common 
law to its promulgated law, that is, its statutes, regulations, 
and constitution. Even at the time of Swift, federal courts gen-
erally deferred to state court interpretations of such law.111 But 
they did not appear to recognize deference as their constitu-
tional obligation.112 It was rather late, and particularly after 
Erie, that deference was seen as constitutionally required.113 
Once again, when the Court finally did impose this obligation 
on federal courts,114 it ignored state law on the matter. It did 
not consider whether a state court might want federal courts to 
come to their own judgment about what the state’s promulgat-
ed law means. 
The gap in Brandeis’s argument is duplicated in state court 
cases that adopted Erie’s position horizontally. An example is 
Forepaugh v. Delaware Railroad,115 in which the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that the decisions of sister states’ courts 
concerning their common law are binding in Pennsylvania. Jus-
tice Mitchell appeared to believe that his conclusion followed 
from positivism. “There is no such thing,” he argued, “as a gen-
eral commercial, or general common law, separate from, and 
irrespective of a particular state or government whose authori-
ty makes it law.”116 But all that follows from positivism is that 
the common law is legally binding in a sister state only because 
of the decisions of the sister state’s authorities. Once these sis-
ter-state authorities have decided to make the common law en-
forceable, the question remains whether the standard in the 
common law should be treated as law or fact. Justice Mitchell 
ignores what the sister states’ courts themselves have to say on 
the matter.  
 
 111. See, e.g., Udell v. The Ohio, 24 F. Cas. 497, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1851). 
 112. See Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205–07 (1863) 
(refusing to recognize the holding of the Iowa Supreme Court invalidating 
bonds under the Iowa Constitution); Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: 
The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1821, 1841 n.69 (2005); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the 
Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1388–89 (1992). 
 113. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common 
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 422 (1964) (attributing to Erie the position “that 
federal courts must follow state decisions on matters of substantive law ap-
propriately cognizable by the states”). 
 114. See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940); Forsyth v. 
City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 518–19 (1897). 
 115. 128 Pa. 217 (1889). 
 116. Id. at 226. 
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II.  THE SUPPRESSED PREMISE: NONDISCRIMINATION   
To repeat, Erie cannot be understood as holding that feder-
al courts must decide questions of state law as the state su-
preme court wishes them to. Otherwise, the extent to which a 
state supreme court’s decisions bind federal courts would be up 
to the state supreme court. But Justice Brandeis states categor-
ically in Erie that federal courts are bound by a state supreme 
court’s decisions. He does not consider what the state supreme 
court might have to say about the matter. He must have as-
sumed that state supreme courts’ power over the binding effect 
of their decisions was limited. The question is why.  
To identify this suppressed premise in Erie, I want to begin 
with an analogue concerning full faith and credit for judg-
ments. Let us assume that a state court has issued a judgment 
in a lawsuit. To what extent does this judgment foreclose sub-
sequent litigation? Within the rendering state court system, of 
course, the effect of the judgment is determined by that state’s 
law of claim and issue preclusion. But the Supreme Court has 
held—with a small number of exceptions117—that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause requires the courts of sister states to 
give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment that 
the judgment would have under the laws of the rendering 
state.118 
Once again, our puzzle arises. This command to sister-
state courts sounds categorical. But what if the rendering state 
wants sister-state courts to come to their own decision about 
the judgment’s preclusive effect?  
A. NONDISCRIMINATION CONCERNING JUDGMENTS 
The Supreme Court has addressed this puzzle in Thomas 
v. Washington Gas & Light Co.119 Thomas concerned full faith 
and credit for a Virginia judgment awarding benefits under the 
Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act. A majority of the Su-
preme Court ultimately concluded that the Virginia award did 
 
 117. E.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 239 n.12 (1998) (hold-
ing that a Michigan state court injunction “is not entitled to full faith and credit 
[in Missouri] . . . because it impermissibly interferes with Missouri’s control of 
litigation brought by parties who were not before the Michigan court”); Fall v. 
Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1909) (stating that a judgment purporting to de-
termine title to real property need not be recognized by a court in the state of 
the situs).  
 118. Baker, 522 U.S. at 223; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908).  
 119. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).  
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not preclude subsequent relief in a different court system, even 
though such relief would not have been available in a Virginia 
court,120 in effect creating an exception to full faith and cred-
it.121 In the course of his opinion, however, Justice Stevens re-
jected a previous case on the matter, Industrial Commission v. 
McCartin.122  
In McCartin, the employer and employee, both citizens of 
Illinois, contracted in Illinois for the employee to work in Wis-
consin, where he was injured. The parties reached a settlement 
concerning benefits under the Illinois Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Act. This settlement, which specifically stated that it did 
“not affect any rights that [the plaintiff] may have under the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Wisconsin,”123 was 
then approved by an administrative tribunal in Illinois. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois judgment approving 
the settlement should not be understood to preclude a subse-
quent award in Wisconsin unless “some unmistakable language 
by [the Illinois] legislature or judiciary would warrant our ac-
cepting such a construction.”124 
Stevens rejected the McCartin rule, because it “authorizes 
a State, by drafting or construing its legislation in ‘unmistaka-
ble language,’ directly to determine the extraterritorial effect of 
its workmen’s compensation awards.”125 The McCartin rule 
“represents an unwarranted delegation to the States of this 
Court’s responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and 
credit questions.”126  
 
 120. Technically, since the question was the full faith and credit obligations 
of a court in the District of Columbia, rather than a sister state, the relevant 
obligations had their source in the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738 (2006). But in such situations, the obligations of the statute have been 
understood as equivalent to those of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See 
Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1318 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 121. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 286. The exception to full faith and credit created 
by Thomas is not easy to characterize, even if one concentrates only on Justice 
Stevens’s plurality opinion. But he found it significant that the Virginia In-
dustrial Commission, which awarded the benefits, was statutorily prohibited 
from applying benefits under the law of sister states. Id. at 280–85.  
 122. 330 U.S. 622 (1947). Although Stevens had only three other Justices 
joining him in his opinion, Rehnquist and Marshall also signed on to the part 
in which the discussion of McCartin occurred. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 290–91 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 123. McCartin, 330 U.S. at 624. 
 124. Id. at 628. 
 125. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 270.  
 126. Id. at 271. 
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In support of his argument, Stevens quoted the following 
passage from an article by Willis Reese and Vincent Johnson: 
Full faith and credit is a national policy, not a state policy. Its pur-
pose is not merely to demand respect from one state for another, but 
rather to give us the benefits of a unified nation by altering the status 
of otherwise “independent, sovereign states.” Hence it is for federal 
law, not state law, to prescribe the measure of credit which one state 
shall give to another’s judgment.127 
In this passage, Reese and Johnson deny that full faith and 
credit is simply about respect for the rendering state’s views 
regarding the preclusive effect of its judgment. It is also about 
what it means for states to coexist in the same nation—for 
them to be part of the same legal system. As a result, full faith 
and credit can restrict the rendering state’s power.  
To be sure, the unity of the American legal system is not 
complete. States retain some measure of sovereignty. This re-
tained sovereignty expresses itself in the fact that the law of 
preclusion is not fully federalized.128 Virginia can reject nonmu-
tual collateral estoppel,129 for example, while California accepts 
it.130 But full faith and credit does put an important limitation 
on a state’s autonomy in this regard. The rendering state can-
not control whether sister states must apply its preclusion law 
to its judgments. As Stevens put it:  
The Full Faith and Credit Clause “is one of the provisions incorpo-
rated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of trans-
forming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a na-
tion.” To vest the power of determining the extraterritorial effect of a 
State’s own laws and judgments in the State itself risks the very kind 
of parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States that it was 
the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other provisions 
of Art. IV of the Constitution to prevent.131 
 
 127. Id. at 271 n.15 (quoting Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The 
Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 161–62 
(1949)). 
 128. Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996) (“State courts 
are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitiga-
tion of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes.”). 
 129. TransDulles Ctr., Inc. v. Sharma, 472 S.E.2d 274, 275 (Va. 1996) 
(“[C]ollateral estoppel in Virginia requires mutuality, that is, a party is gener-
ally prevented from invoking the preclusive force of a judgment unless that 
party would have been bound had the prior litigation of the issue reached the 
opposite result.”). 
 130. Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 237 (Cal. 1999) 
(“[B]ecause [collateral] estoppel need not be mutual, it is not necessary that the 
earlier and later proceedings involve the identical parties or their privies.”). 
 131. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 271–72 (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 
355 (1948)).  
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One worry about giving the rendering state the power to 
determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments is that it 
might seek to obligate sister states to use its preclusion law 
when otherwise no such obligation would exist.132 This would 
be an obvious example of “parochial entrenchment on the inter-
ests of other States.”133 But the purpose of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause is also frustrated when the rendering state at-
tempts to release sister states of their obligations to apply its 
preclusion law. Indeed, the passage by Reese and Johnson 
quoted by Stevens concerned “the rare case, such as McCartin, 
where the first state declares explicitly that its judgment is to 
be conclusive only within its own borders.”134  
One might wonder what could be bad about a state giving 
sister states the freedom to apply their preclusion law to its 
judgments. Shouldn’t such self-sacrifice be encouraged? Keep in 
mind, however, that we are speaking of a state that seeks to re-
lease sister states of what would otherwise be their constitu-
tional obligation to use its preclusion law. To say that such a 
constitutional obligation exists means that the Supreme Court 
has determined that sister states’ interests are not sufficient to 
permit horizontal disuniformity in the treatment of the state’s 
judgments. By seeking to release sister states of this obligation, 
the rendering state is setting its own judgment against the Su-
preme Court’s concerning this national policy in favor of legal 
uniformity.  
The point is not that sister states’ interests can never be 
strong enough to permit them to apply their own preclusion law 
to a judgment rendered in another state. The Supreme Court 
 
 132. It is a different question, which I will not discuss here, whether full 
faith and credit permits the recognizing state at its own discretion to give a 
judgment greater preclusive effect than it has under the rendering state’s law. 
See, e.g., Hart v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812–14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1969) (applying New York’s law of nonmutual collateral estoppel to determine 
the preclusive effect of decision by a court in Texas, even though Texas’s law of 
collateral estoppel requires mutuality). But see Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex 
FP, Inc., 584 A.2d 1214, 1217–18 (Del. 1991) (holding that a Delaware court 
must use Kansas law of collateral estoppel, which requires mutuality, to de-
termine the preclusive effect of a decision by a court in Kansas, even though 
Delaware abandoned the mutuality requirement). For a discussion of the prob-
lem, see Gene R. Shreve, Judgments from a Choice-of-Law Perspective, 40 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 985, 985–89 (1992).  
 133. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 261. 
 134. Reese & Johnson, supra note 135, at 161. I set aside here the compli-
cations added by the fact that McCartin involved the judicial approval of a set-
tlement agreement. In such a case, the effect of the judgment arguably should 
be understood solely as effectuating the parties’ contract. 
  
1140 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1111 
 
has recognized cases in which horizontal disuniformity is per-
missible. Exceptions to full faith and credit do exist.135 Indeed, 
Thomas is one case in which an exception was recognized. The 
question is whether it should be up to the rendering state what 
the exceptions are.  
One way of understanding Thomas is that the rendering 
state’s right to full faith and credit is inalienable. In common 
parlance, the inalienability of a right indicates its importance 
or that it is especially protected from being abridged. But, 
properly speaking, a right is inalienable when the protections 
of the right cannot be altered by the right-holder.136 She lacks 
the power to control her right. Under Thomas, if the rendering 
state has a right that sister states give its judgment full faith 
and credit, it has no power to change this right. 
So far we have understood Thomas to prohibit Virginia 
from controlling sister states’ duty to apply its preclusion law. 
But imagine that Virginia’s preclusion law simply assigns dif-
ferent preclusive effects to a Virginia judgment depending upon 
whether it is being recognized in a Virginia or a sister-state 
court. In a Virginia court, the normal Virginia standards of 
claim and issue preclusion apply. But sister-state courts are 
given power, under Virginia law, to come up with whatever 
preclusion standards they think are best.  
In such a case, Virginia might legitimately deny that it was 
seeking to release sister states of their duty to use Virginia 
preclusion law. When the sister-state courts came up with their 
own preclusion standards, they would be using Virginia preclu-
sion law because they would be exercising powers delegated to 
them by Virginia law. It is clear, however, that Stevens would 
still find this impermissible, for, as he put it, a state may not 
“directly . . . determine the extraterritorial effect” of its judg-
ments.137 Virginia is not merely prohibited from freeing sister 
states of the duty to use its preclusion law—it is also prohibited 
from discriminating in its preclusion law on the basis of the ju-
risdiction of the recognizing court. Virginia can influence the 
way a sister state treats a Virginia judgment only indirectly, by 
determining the way the judgment is treated in its own court 
system. 
 
 135. See supra note 117. 
 136. See generally A. John Simmons, Inalienable Rights and Locke’s Trea-
tises, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175 (1983).  
 137. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 270. 
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One way of putting the limitation on the Virginia Supreme 
Court is that it is obligated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
to conceive of sister-state courts as coexisting with its own in a 
unified nation. This prohibits it from varying the preclusive ef-
fect of Virginia judgments on the basis of the jurisdiction of the 
recognizing court. The Virginia Supreme Court is permitted to 
come up only with jurisdictionally neutral standards concern-
ing their preclusive effect—standards that are applicable equal-
ly to sister-state courts.  
The requirement of horizontal nondiscrimination applies to 
a state’s preclusion law even when sister states have no full 
faith and credit duty to apply the state’s law. Assume, for ex-
ample, that a Virginia court issues a judgment purporting to 
determine title to real property in New York. This is one area 
where the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to full 
faith and credit.138 A New York court has no obligation to apply 
Virginia preclusion law concerning the judgment. But assume 
it chooses to apply Virginia preclusion law anyway. It would 
still be prohibited from giving effect to any Virginia rule that 
discriminated on the basis of jurisdiction, since such a rule vi-
olates Virginia’s obligations under full faith and credit. For a 
New York court to apply Virginia preclusion law must mean 
giving a Virginia judgment the legal effect it would have in 
Virginia courts.139 
To repeat, there is a constitutional requirement, tied to the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, that a state’s preclusion law be 
jurisdictionally neutral horizontally. But a similar nondiscrim-
ination requirement applies vertically. Under the Full Faith 
and Credit Statute,140 federal courts, with a few exceptions, are 
also required to use the rendering state’s law when determin-
ing the preclusive effect of a state court judgment.141 The stat-
 
 138. E.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1909) (holding that a Nebraska 
court is not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize the de-
cree of a Washington court purporting to alter title to land in Nebraska). 
 139. One might argue, however, that the New York court would be free to 
give effect to the discriminatory Virginia rule because that could be rede-
scribed as the assertion of its own lawmaking power. I reject such a position at 
infra note 153.  
 140. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). 
 141. E.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 
(1984) (“It is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judg-
ment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the 
law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”). The question of the 
full faith and credit obligations of federal courts with respect to state judg-
ments is complicated by the fact that the obligation is statutory. Congress 
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ute surely incorporates Thomas’s requirements: the rendering 
state may not control federal courts’ statutory duty to use its 
preclusion law,142 and its preclusion law may not discriminate 
on the basis of whether the recognizing court is domestic or 
federal.143 For a federal court to use Virginia preclusion law 
must mean that it is giving a Virginia judgment the same legal 
effect it would have in Virginia courts, even if Virginia has said 
the legal effect should be different. 
B. EXTENDING NONDISCRIMINATION FROM JUDGMENTS TO LAWS 
We have drawn from Thomas a requirement of jurisdic-
tional neutrality binding a state’s preclusion law. The render-
ing state must assign its judgments the same preclusive effect 
throughout the American legal system. We can now fill the gap 
in Brandeis’s argument in Erie (and in Justice Mitchell’s argu-
ment in Forepaugh), by expanding this requirement of jurisdic-
tional neutrality to state law in general, including to the com-
mon-law decisions of a state’s courts.144 A state supreme court 
must give its common-law decisions the same legal effect 
throughout the American legal system. 
 
might expressly or impliedly repeal the Full Faith and Credit Statute. Repeal 
is a particular concern if the action brought in federal court is under federal 
law. The application of the rendering state’s preclusion law might frustrate 
federal interests standing behind the federal law. Stephen B. Burbank, Inter-
jurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A 
General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 817–29 (1986); Howard M. Erich-
son, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 996–97 (1998). 
 142. Indeed, since the recognizing court in Thomas was a court in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, strictly speaking, Thomas concerned the statute rather than 
the clause.  
 143. It is also worth noting that a vertical nondiscrimination principle 
should apply in the other direction to federal judgments in state courts. Al-
though the exact constitutional source is uncertain, state courts are obligated 
to give federal judgments the same preclusive effect they would have under 
the law that would be applied in federal court. E.g., 18B CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4468 (2d 
ed. 2002); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 749 
(1976). It should follow that federal courts cannot release state courts of this 
duty, nor can they discriminate in their preclusion law on the basis of whether 
the recognizing court is federal or state. Just what preclusion law will apply to 
a federal judgment in federal court is a different issue, however, and a compli-
cated one in diversity cases. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 
U.S. 497, 506–09 (2001). 
 144. The expansion of the nondiscrimination requirement in the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause to all laws is suggested by Justice Stevens in Thomas. 
Thomas, 448 U.S. at 271–72 (noting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause de-
nies a state “the power of determining the extraterritorial effect of [its] own 
laws and judgments” (emphasis added)). 
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To make the analogy with Thomas clear, it is best to begin 
with the attempt by a state to release sister states of what oth-
erwise would be their constitutional obligation under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause to apply the state’s common law. Con-
sider a suit by a Georgian against a Georgian concerning a 
fight between the two that took place in Georgia. A New York 
state court entertaining such a case would be obligated to use 
Georgia law.145 To be sure, the constitutional limitations on its 
power to apply New York law are weak. According to Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Hague, all it needs to satisfy the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, as well as the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,146 is “a significant contact or signifi-
cant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that 
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally un-
fair.”147 Nevertheless, in this case the requirements in Allstate 
are not satisfied.  
Let us assume that the Georgia Supreme Court has a 
common-law battery rule covering the matter.148 It has stated, 
however, that the rule is binding only on Georgia state courts. 
Sister-state courts are free to apply their own law to the fight. 
One might think that in freeing sister-state courts of the duty 
 
 145. One might wonder how a New York state court would obtain jurisdic-
tion of such a case. Since state courts are courts of general subject-matter ju-
risdiction, its primary jurisdictional hurdle is obtaining personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant. But this would exist if the defendant was served within 
New York while on a business trip there, Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 
604, 628 (1990) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not prohibit the California 
courts from exercising jurisdiction over petitioner based on the fact of in-state 
service of process.”), or if the defendant consented. Such contact, although suf-
ficient for personal jurisdiction, would still not satisfy Allstate. To be sure, our 
New York state court is likely to dismiss the action, despite possessing juris-
diction, on forum non conveniens grounds. But examples where a court that is 
constitutionally obligated to apply sister state law would not dismiss for forum 
non conveniens can be found, such as a nationwide class action. Green, supra 
note 63, at pts. II.C, III.C. 
 146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”). 
 147. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981).  
 148. The Full Faith and Credit Clause applies not just to state statutory 
law, but also to common law. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 
(1998) (speaking of “legislative measures and common law” as the “laws” to 
which full faith and credit is due); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 
430, 436 (1943) (referring to full “faith and credit . . . to which local common 
and statutory law is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States”); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for 
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 25–27 (1991); Robert H. Jack-
son, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (1945).  
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to apply its law, the Georgia Supreme Court is showing admi-
rable self-sacrifice. It has allowed sister-state courts to take 
their own interests into account. But we are speaking of an 
area in which the Supreme Court has concluded that only 
Georgia has a legitimate regulatory interest. It has decided 
that sister-state interests cannot justify horizontal disuniformi-
ty in the legal standard applied. It is not for the Georgia Su-
preme Court to undermine this national policy in favor of legal 
uniformity.  
Let us now assume that the Georgia Supreme Court in-
stead insists that the proper common-law standard in battery 
cases under Georgia law is a matter which sister-state courts 
are permitted to come to their own judgment. Of course, the 
Georgia Supreme Court is free to decide what its own common-
law battery rule is. But, as we saw in connection with full faith 
and credit for judgments, it cannot discriminate on the basis of 
jurisdiction to surreptitiously release sister states of their duty 
to apply its law. And that is just what the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s approach does. It assigns different legal effects to its 
common-law decisions on the basis of whether the decision is 
being recognized by a Georgia or a sister-state court.  
Notice that the Georgia Supreme Court cannot respond 
that sister-state courts should be free to decide the standards 
in Georgia common law because the question is one of fact rath-
er than law. The point is not that it is forbidden from treating 
what most states would describe as law as fact.149 The court 
can claim that the standard for common-law battery in Georgia 
is a factual question, concerning which the adjudicating court 
(or its jury) may exercise its own judgment—although it might 
thereby render Georgia law dangerously indeterminate. But 
this distinction between law and fact must be applied in a non-
discriminatory fashion. It cannot treat the standard as fact for 
sister-state courts, and as law for Georgia state courts. If the 
question is truly a factual one, then Georgia state trial courts 
must treat it as a question of fact as well. They must be permit-
ted to come to their own conclusions about the common law in 
Georgia, without deference to the decisions of the Georgia Su-
preme Court.150 On the other hand, if the Georgia Supreme 
 
 149. For a skeptical view about the ability to distinguish between law and 
fact in any formal manner, see Lawrence Alexander, What’s Inside and Out-
side the Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 150. Furthermore, it is arguable that there should be no appellate review 
of their decisions or that such review, rather than being de novo, should be ac-
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Court insists that its decisions are binding on Georgia state 
courts, they must be binding on sister-state courts as well. 
Let us now expand our argument vertically. If a federal 
court were adjudicating the Georgia fight, it would—absent 
some federal statute or federal interest giving it lawmaking 
power—be obligated under Erie also to apply Georgia law.151 
And just as the Georgia Supreme Court cannot permit sister-
state courts to apply sister-state law, so it cannot permit feder-
al courts to apply federal law. Here, too, it might at first appear 
that by permitting federal courts to apply federal law the Geor-
gia Supreme Court is expressing a commendable spirit of self-
sacrifice—since it is allowing federal courts to adjudicate the 
fight in accordance with federal, rather than Georgia, interests. 
But we are speaking of an area in which the Supreme Court, 
interpreting Erie, has concluded that there are no legitimate 
federal regulatory interests. It is not for the Georgia Supreme 
Court to undermine this national policy in favor of vertical uni-
formity.152 
And, once again, the Georgia Supreme Court cannot use 
discrimination in its laws to accomplish what it could not do di-
rectly. It cannot assign different legal effects to its common-law 
decisions on the basis of whether the decision is being consid-
ered by a Georgia or a federal court. The Georgia Supreme 
Court must treat federal courts as coexisting with Georgia state 
courts in a single legal system. The binding effect of its deci-
sions must be jurisdictionally neutral. 
In making this argument, I have concentrated on cases in 
which federal and sister-state courts are obligated under Erie 
and full faith and credit to apply a particular state’s law. But 
the requirement of jurisdictional neutrality applies even when 
this is not true. Consider two New Yorkers who get into a fight 
in Georgia. One New Yorker brings suit against the other in 
New York state court. Although, under Allstate, the court could 
 
cording to the deferential standard reserved for questions of fact. See infra 
note 155. 
 151. As for the federal court obtaining jurisdiction for such a case, subject-
matter jurisdiction would be the primary constitutional hurdle. Although 
there would be no federal subject-matter jurisdiction under diversity, a federal 
court might get jurisdiction over the action under supplemental jurisdiction. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
 152. Although I will not discuss the matter here, the same principle should 
apply to federal common law too. Assume that the Supreme Court creates a 
federal common-law rule. It may not free state courts of their duty, under the 
Supremacy Clause, to abide by its decision, except by freeing lower federal 
courts of the same duty. 
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apply New York common law of battery, assume that it chooses 
to apply Georgia common law instead. It still must ignore 
Georgia’s Swiftian view of Georgia common law. To the extent 
that the Georgia Supreme Court’s views about the legal effect 
of its common-law decisions are not jurisdictionally neutral, 
they are invalid under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For a 
New York state court to apply Georgia common law can only 
mean giving Georgia decisions the same legal effect they would 
have in Georgia courts.153  
A similar situation could arise, although more rarely, in a 
vertical context. Sometimes a federal court that has lawmaking 
power—due to the presence of a sufficient federal interest—
makes the decision to use state law anyway.154 If such a federal 
court applies Georgia common law, it would not be permitted to 
give effect to Georgia’s Swiftian view of this common law. To 
the extent that the Georgia Supreme Court’s views about the 
legal effect of its common-law decisions are not jurisdictionally 
neutral vertically, they are invalid under Erie. For a federal 
court to apply Georgia common law can only mean giving Geor-
gia decisions the same legal effect they would have in Georgia 
courts. 
Notice that jurisdictional neutrality is required of all Geor-
gia Supreme Court decisions—not just those interpreting its 
common law. The Georgia Supreme Court may free sister-state 
and federal courts from the duty to defer to its interpretations 
of Georgia statutes only if it frees lower Georgia courts of the 
 
 153. Could one argue that the New York court is permitted to give virtual 
effect to the Georgia Supreme Court’s Swiftian view of Georgia common law 
and interpret Georgia common law as it sees fit, since that could simply be re-
described as the permissible exercise of its own lawmaking power? The answer 
to this question rests on whether the discretionary choice to apply sister-state 
law can generate full faith and credit duties to interpret this law with fidelity. 
If the New York court, having chosen to apply Georgia common law, is obli-
gated to interpret this law correctly, it cannot give effect to the Georgia Su-
preme Court’s Swiftian view of Georgia common law since that is not a valid 
part of Georgia law. Some have argued that lawmaking power frees the forum 
of any duty to interpret nonforum law with fidelity. Note, Misconstruction of 
Sister State Law in Conflict of Laws, 12 STAN. L. REV. 653, 653 (1960). In 
Green, supra note 63, at pt. V, I argue that if the forum with lawmaking power 
uses standards drawn from sister-state law in order to foster its own regulato-
ry purposes, the law applied should be understood as forum law and no full 
faith and credit obligations apply. On the other hand, if—as is usually the 
case—it uses sister-state law out of deference to the regulatory interests of the 
sister state, the law applied is truly sister-state law and the forum has a duty 
under full faith and credit to interpret this law correctly.  
 154. For a discussion, see Green, supra note 63, at pt. V.A.  
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same duty. Since the Georgia Supreme Court considers lower 
Georgia state courts bound by its interpretations of Georgia 
statutes, sister-state and federal courts must also be bound.155  
The requirement of nondiscrimination explains why Bran-
deis could conclude in Erie that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decisions were binding on federal courts, whether or not 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said they were binding. It 
was enough to know that these decisions were binding upon 
 
 155. Indeed, it is not clear that freeing Georgia’s lower courts of a duty to 
follow its decisions would be sufficient for the Georgia Supreme Court to per-
mit sister-state and federal courts to do the same. Consider the example of 
Louisiana. Owing to Louisiana’s civil-law tradition, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s decisions interpreting Louisiana statutes are not binding upon lower 
Louisiana courts, except in the particular case in which the decision was 
made. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000); Constr. Mate-
rials, Inc. v. Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 365, 367 (La. 1980). Some have 
argued that federal courts are therefore permitted to come to their own inter-
pretation of a Louisiana statute, without considering themselves bound by the 
decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Black v. Rebstock Drilling Co., 837 
F. Supp. 200, 204–05 (W.D. La. 1993); Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian 
Venturer in a Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. 
REV. 1369, 1372–76 (1988). As it turns out, however, federal courts follow the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretations of Louisiana statutes and, when 
the matter is unsettled, attempt to predict how it would resolve the matter. 
E.g., Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999); Transcon. 
Gas v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1992); St. Charles Ven-
tures, L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687 (E.D. La. 2003) (“To 
determine a state law question, we first look to decisions of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court. If the Louisiana Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, it 
is our duty to determine as best we can what that court would decide.”).  
Are federal courts insufficiently sensitive to Louisiana’s unique Gallic her-
itage? Not necessarily. Even though a Louisiana trial court is not bound by 
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions, the matter can be appealed up to the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court. If it disagrees with the trial court, its decision is bind-
ing in the case being adjudicated. Under the predictive method, a federal court 
interpreting a Louisiana statute should seek to replicate, not a Louisiana trial 
court’s decision on the matter, but how the case would turn out in the Louisi-
ana state court system generally, including the possibility of appeal. See infra 
Part III.A; cf. Dorf, supra note 86, at 714 (“[A] federal court sitting in diversity 
does not see itself anywhere within the state court hierarchy.”). Since a federal 
court should identify with the Louisiana court system and we assume that 
there would have been a successful appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court if 
the case had been litigated there, a federal court would still be obligated to abide 
by the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decisions. The only way that federal courts 
might be released of the duty to follow the Louisiana Supreme Court’s inter-
pretations of Louisiana statutes is if Louisiana trial courts were not merely 
free to ignore the Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretations, but also if the 
interpretations made by Louisiana trial courts were not subject to appeal (or, 
perhaps, not subject to de novo appeal).  
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Pennsylvania state courts.156 It followed from nondiscrimina-
tion that they must be binding on federal courts.157 
 
 156. Technically, the gap in Brandeis’s argument is not completely filled, 
for he still ignored the possibility that the state supreme court released even 
the courts of its own state of the duty to abide by its common-law decisions. 
But given that this is exceedingly unlikely—and indeed would probably mean 
that the state had no common law at all—he cannot be blamed for ignoring 
this possibility. 
 157. It might appear that this Article seeks to resurrect an equal protection 
justification of Erie. E.g., Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunion-
ism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 998–99 (1996). The only differ-
ence in my argument would be that it was state (rather than federal) courts 
that violated equal protection in Swift—by discriminating concerning the 
binding effect of their decisions on the basis of jurisdiction. Thus, the Four-
teenth, rather than the Fifth, Amendment would have been violated.  
One problem with such an equal protection reading of Erie, of course, is 
that there was no Fourteenth Amendment when Swift was decided. We would 
have to conclude, therefore, that Swift was valid when it was decided, and that 
Erie was necessary only after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
something not suggested in Justice Brandeis’s opinion. Cf. Clark, Constitu-
tional, supra note 80, at 1299 (rejecting the Fifth Amendment equal protection 
reading of Erie because “at the time the Court decided Erie, it had not yet in-
terpreted the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause to (reverse) incorporate 
an equal protection component applicable to the federal government”). But 
there are other reasons to reject an equal protection reading of Erie. Such a 
reading would focus on the interests of the parties before the court. But the 
primary problem with the Georgia Supreme Court treating its common-law 
decisions as binding only on Georgia state courts is not that it discriminates 
against certain groups of litigants. Indeed, since Georgia thinks that not only 
federal but also sister-state courts can come to their own judgment about 
Georgia common law, it is not clear exactly what group is being discriminated 
against. A plaintiff does not have to be from a different state than the defendant 
to get a different interpretation of Georgia common law. All he has to do is sue 
in another state. The real problem with Georgia’s approach is that it fails to re-
spect the place of sister-state and federal courts in the American legal system.  
This Article models its argument on Thomas, which prohibited a state 
from discriminating in the preclusive effect of its judgments on the basis of the 
jurisdiction of the recognizing court. Justice Stevens derived this nondiscrimi-
nation principle, not from equal protection, but from the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. I argue Stevens’s argument can be extended from a state’s preclusion 
law to its law in general—and in particular to the common-law decisions of its 
courts. Thus, in my argument the prohibition on horizontal discrimination has 
its source, as it did in Thomas, in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Although 
the Clause would appear to apply only to sister-state courts—obligating them 
to obey a state supreme court’s common-law decisions—I believe it also puts a 
duty of jurisdictional neutrality on the state supreme court itself. A state su-
preme court cannot treat as relevant to the legal effect of its common-law deci-
sions whether the effect is in a domestic or sister-state court. As for the prohi-
bition on vertical discrimination, this has its source, not in equal protection, 
but in Erie. Although Erie appears to bind only federal courts—obligating 
them to obey a state supreme court’s common-law decisions—it puts a duty of 
vertical jurisdictional neutrality on the state supreme court.  
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That Brandeis relied upon a nondiscrimination principle in 
Erie should not be surprising, for the Court has recognized sim-
ilar nondiscrimination principles in other circumstances.158 In 
Railway Co. v. Whitton, for example, the Court held that Wis-
consin’s wrongful death statute could not prohibit actions un-
der the statute from being entertained by federal courts.159 The 
Wisconsin statute was not allowed to discriminate vertically 
against federal jurisdiction.  
A horizontal example, cited by Stevens in Thomas, is Ten-
nessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George.160 George held that 
a Georgia court could entertain an action under Alabama’s 
workers’ compensation statute even though the statute limited 
jurisdiction to courts in Alabama. Because the Alabama statute 
horizontally discriminated against sister-state jurisdiction, it 
violated full faith and credit.161 
 
 158. One such case is Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), which is com-
monly understood as holding that a state court may not refuse to entertain an 
action simply because it is under the law of a sister state. For a discussion of 
Hughes, see Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to 
Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules 
and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REV. 819, 825–26 (1983); Larry Kramer, 
Same Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy 
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1980–86 (1997). Notice that our nondiscrimina-
tion principle is the mirror image of Hughes’s. In Hughes, there was discrimi-
nation in state jurisdiction concerning sister-state law. We are concerned with 
discrimination in state law concerning sister-state (and federal) jurisdiction. 
 159. Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 285–86 (1871). 
 160. 233 U.S. 354 (1914) (cited in Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 
261, 271 n.15). 
 161. Id. at 359–60. It might seem incompatible with a nondiscrimination 
reading of George that the Court relied upon the fact that the Alabama cause 
of action was transitory—as evidenced by the fact that it could be brought in 
any court in Alabama. The Court suggested that had the Alabama statute 
made it clear that an action under the statute is nontransitory—for example, 
by insisting that it can be brought only before a particular court in Alabama—
the Georgia court would have been forbidden to entertain it. But this is argua-
bly compatible with a nondiscrimination reading. In such a case, Alabama 
would have decided where actions under the statute could be brought on the 
basis of a criterion that applied to some Alabama as well as sister-state courts. 
If there were good reasons for allowing actions under the statute to be brought 
only before, say, the Alabama workers’ compensation board, rather than in a 
court of general jurisdiction in Alabama, there would arguably be nothing dis-
criminatory about using these same reasons to prohibit the actions in sister-
state courts. 
In Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965), it appeared as if the 
Supreme Court went even further and concluded that a state may never make 
a cause of action nontransitory. The Court held that it was not a violation of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause for an Alabama state court to take jurisdic-
tion of an action under the Georgia Workmen’s Compensation Act, even 
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To be sure, in these cases the discrimination was extreme, 
since the state sought to totally divest federal and sister-state 
courts of the ability to entertain actions under its law. Fur-
thermore, the discrimination was negative, since federal and 
sister-state courts were given less freedom than domestic 
courts possessed. But since, as these cases show, the Supreme 
Court can compel a state to allow federal and sister-state juris-
diction for its causes of action, and it has put on the federal and 
sister-state courts an obligation—under Erie and full faith and 
credit—to respect the decisions of the state’s courts when in-
terpreting these causes of action, it is hardly a stretch that 
Brandeis concluded that the state’s supreme court itself has a 
duty—again under Erie and full faith and credit—not to dis-
rupt federal and sister-state courts’ interpretive duties through 
discrimination concerning the binding effect of its decisions. 
On the other hand, if I am wrong and state supreme courts 
may engage in such discrimination, I think we have to conclude 
Justice Brandeis’s argument in Erie fails. Whether state su-
preme court decisions bind federal courts must be answered by 
reference to state law. Given the continued vitality of Slaton, a 
federal court should exercise its own judgment about what 
Georgia common law is. 
C. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
To sum up, I have argued that the Erie doctrine and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibit state supreme courts 
from discriminating in the legal effect of their common-law de-
cisions. For federal and sister-state courts to apply a state’s 
common law must mean that they give the decisions of the 
state’s supreme court the same legal effect they have in the 
state’s own courts. 
But assume that the Georgia Supreme Court has a com-
mon-law rule stating that a plaintiff in a battery suit must pro-
vide the defendant with in-hand service of the summons and 
complaint. It certainly seems permissible for it to release feder-
al and sister-state courts of any duty to apply this service rule, 
 
though the Act stated that a remedy could be provided only by the Georgia 
Compensation Board. But the Court appeared to treat the case as one in which 
Alabama had sufficient contacts to permissibly displace Georgia law on the 
jurisdictional limitation with Alabama law—not that Georgia law itself could 
not make a cause of action nontransitory. It is probable, therefore, that a state 
court without sufficient contacts to apply forum law would be bound to respect 
a sister state’s treatment of its actions as nontransitory, provided that the sis-
ter state did not violate our nondiscrimination principle. 
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even when they are applying Georgia battery law. But because 
lower Georgia courts must apply the service rule, this looks like 
a violation of the duty of nondiscrimination. 
The solution is to draw a distinction between what is regu-
lated by Georgia’s battery law and its service rule. The battery 
law regulates nonlitigation activities (such as people fighting in 
Georgia). But the service rule does not. It is procedural in the 
sense that it regulates only how suits brought in Georgia state 
courts proceed. So understood, the service rule would fail to be 
jurisdictionally neutral only if the Georgia Supreme Court 
claimed that sister-state and federal courts were permitted to 
use their own standards when determining whether service in 
a battery action in Georgia state court was adequate.162  
Notice that we cannot rely upon a state’s own characteriza-
tion of its law as substantive or procedural. Otherwise, it could 
circumvent its duty of nondiscrimination simply by designating 
as procedural its decisions about substantive rights under its 
law. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court could give effect 
to its Swiftian view about Georgia common law by claiming 
that its common-law decisions are actually procedural rules 
that are applicable only in Georgia state courts.  
 The Supreme Court touched upon the problem of a state’s 
duty to treat its law as substantive in Sun Oil v. Wortman, 
which held that a Kansas state court had no constitutional ob-
ligation under full faith and credit to apply Texas’s statute of 
limitations, even though it was entertaining a Texas cause of 
action.163 Drawing upon international law at the time of the 
ratification of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Justice Scalia 
concluded that “the society which adopted the Constitution did 
not regard statutes of limitations as substantive provisions, 
akin to the rules governing the validity and effect of contracts, 
but rather as procedural restrictions fashioned by each jurisdic-
tion for its own courts.”164 Noting that Texas did not treat its 
statute of limitations as substantive and thus did not want its 
limitation to follow the Texas action into a Kansas court, Scalia 
argued that the question the Court was facing was whether 
 
 162. This might arise if a Georgia judgment were being collaterally at-
tacked in federal or sister-state court on grounds of inadequate service. 
 163. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988). 
 164. Id. at 726; see also Great W. Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U.S. 329, 338–39 
(1896) (holding that full faith and credit for the rendering state’s judgment 
does not require the recognizing state to use the rendering state’s statute of 
limitations for enforcing such judgments). 
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Texas was constitutionally compelled “to consider [its] statutes 
of limitations substantive.”165 He concluded it was not. 
Because statutes of limitations (and service rules) may be 
treated by a state as procedural under Sun Oil, Georgia would 
not be understood as jurisdictionally discriminating concerning 
its battery law simply because it denied that its battery statute 
of limitations or service rule was binding on sister-state courts. 
On the other hand, it should not be able to surreptitiously en-
force its Swiftian view of Georgia common law by claiming that 
its common-law decisions are actually procedural rules that are 
applicable only in Georgia state courts. In such a case, the Su-
preme Court could identify the decisions as constitutionally 
substantive, and so binding on sister-state courts, whatever 
Georgia itself might say about the matter. 
I do not want to suggest that it will always be easy to de-
termine when a state has wrongly designated its substantive 
law as procedural and so has violated our horizontal nondis-
crimination principle. After all, it is not always easy to tell 
whether a forum has abused its power over procedure to escape 
its full faith and credit obligations to apply a sister state’s sub-
stantive law.166 But the difficulty of answering the latter ques-
tion has not prevented the Supreme Court from trying.167  
A constitutional distinction between substance and proce-
dure is also needed in a vertical context, in order to determine 
whether a state gives its substantive law the same legal effect 
 
 165. Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 729 n.3. In fact, Scalia considered the issue of 
Texas’s power to designate its statute of limitations as procedural in the con-
text of a challenge under the Due Process Clause, rather than the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, although it is not clear what rested upon this categoriza-
tion. Id.For an example in which a state understands its statute of limitations 
as following its causes of action into foreign courts, see Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 
451, 454 (1904).  
 166. For an example of a court catching a state legislature attempting to 
use its control over procedure to wiggle out of its full faith and credit obliga-
tions concerning sister-state judgments, see City of Philadelphia v. Bauer, 478 
A.2d 773, 778–80 (N.J. 1984). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
struck down a New Jersey statute that prohibited the enforcement of employ-
ment wage tax judgments through the sale of realty. The statute was enacted 
in response to the passage in Philadelphia of a commuter tax. The court held 
that the New Jersey statute, although apparently procedural, violated New 
Jersey’s full faith and credit obligation to respect Pennsylvania commuter tax 
judgments.  
 167. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (holding that a state 
“may not, under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the enforce-
ment of claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit clause, 
when its courts have general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the par-
ties”). For a discussion of Broderick, see Kramer, supra note 158, at 1984–86. 
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in federal courts as in its own. Although the Supreme Court 
has not dealt with this problem, it has dealt with the converse 
problem of a federal court abusing its power over procedure to 
escape its obligations under Erie to apply a state’s substantive 
law. Here it has drawn constitutional distinctions between sub-
stance and procedure that determine the limits of the federal 
court’s obligations. 
Notice that I am speaking here of the limits of a federal 
court’s power over procedure due to its constitutional obligation 
under Erie to apply state substantive law. There is a very dif-
ferent Erie doctrine, of nonconstitutional origin, that puts lim-
its on federal courts’ ability to create procedural common law 
when entertaining state law actions. They are constrained by a 
“policy”168 that recommends uniformity with the procedural law 
of the state where the federal court is located if this is needed 
to discourage vertical forum shopping and to avoid the inequi-
table administration of the laws.169 For example, if a federal 
court in New York were entertaining our Georgia battery ac-
tion, this policy of uniformity would recommend that the feder-
al court use New York’s statute of limitations (or, more accu-
rately, the statute of limitations that would be used by a New 
York state court), rather than a federal common-law limitation, 
because a difference between the federal and the New York lim-
itations would promote vertical forum shopping and the ineq-
uitable administration of the laws. Most cases described as Erie 
problems by federal courts concern this nonconstitutional ques-
tion.170 
One of the few cases in which the Supreme Court has dealt 
with the constitutional distinction between substance and pro-
cedure in an Erie context is Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric 
Cooperative.171 The question in Byrd was whether a South Car-
olina law requiring that an element of a South Carolina cause 
of action be decided by a judge would apply when the action 
 
 168. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
 169. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). Many characterize the 
nonconstitutional doctrine as having its source in the Rules of Decision Act. 
See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 707–
18 (1974); Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gaspe-
rini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (1998); Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, 
Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 356, 361 (1977). Although I do not think that this can be the 
statutory source of the policy, I will not take on the matter here.  
 170. See supra note 64. 
 171. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
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was entertained by a federal court.172 Justice Brennan noted 
that as a constitutional matter Erie required federal courts sit-
ting in diversity to “respect the definition of state-created 
rights and obligations by the state courts,” including state prac-
tices “bound up with these rights and obligations.”173 Beyond 
that area, the “policy” in favor of uniformity between state and 
federal procedure applied.174 
To be sure, in Byrd, Brennan comes dangerously close to 
saying that a federal court is constitutionally bound under Erie 
to respect a state’s own views about which elements of the 
state’s laws and practices are bound up with state-created 
rights and obligations. The result of such an approach would be 
that a state would have the power, by claiming that the entire-
ty of its procedural law is bound up with its substantive law, to 
displace all federal procedural common law when federal courts 
entertained the state’s actions. Likewise, the Georgia Supreme 
Court would be permitted, by claiming that its common-law de-
cisions were not bound up with substantive rights under its 
common law, to give effect to its Swiftian view of Georgia com-
mon law in federal court.  
It is more likely that Brennan meant to identify an inde-
pendent constitutional distinction between substance and pro-
cedure of the sort articulated in full faith and credit contexts.175 
Under this standard, Georgia would not be understood as hav-
ing violated Erie simply because it freed federal courts of the 
duty to apply its service rule or statute of limitations. But it 
would have violated Erie if it treated its common-law decisions 
as procedural rules binding only on Georgia state courts.  
 
 172. Id. at 534. 
 173. Id. at 535. 
 174. Id. at 536. Although some doubt has been expressed about the viabili-
ty of Byrd in light of subsequent Supreme Court cases, such doubts concern an 
issue independent of that discussed here; namely, whether a federal court, in 
deciding whether forum state law not bound up with state rights and obliga-
tions should be applied in a federal court, should look to “countervailing” fed-
eral interests. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 62, at 267–69 (questioning 
whether Gasperini endorsed Byrd’s examination of countervailing federal in-
terests). This doubt is not directed at Byrd’s delineation of the constitutional 
scope of Erie. But see Lindsey C. Boney IV, Forum-Shopping Through the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 60 ALA. L. REV. 151, 173 n.129 (2008). 
 175. Indeed, the constitutional Erie distinction between substance and pro-
cedure is likely the same as the full faith and credit distinction, although I will 
not argue for this point here.  
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III.  THE PREDICTIVE METHOD   
Up to this point, we have been concerned with the puzzle of 
a state supreme court that seeks to free federal and sister-state 
courts of the duty to respect decisions that it has actually (and 
recently) issued concerning the state’s law. But a similar puzzle 
arises concerning unsettled state law—which I will understand 
broadly as legal issues that have not been definitely resolved by 
the state’s supreme court, either because it has never dealt 
with the matter or because a past resolution might be overruled 
if revisited.  
A. WHAT IF STATE COURTS DON’T WANT YOU TO PREDICT THEIR 
DECISIONS? 
The Supreme Court has indicated that a federal court ad-
dressing an unsettled issue of state law must predict what the 
state supreme court would do.176 It should defer to the decision 
that would exist if the unsettled issue had been brought up in 
the state court system and ultimately been appealed to the 
state’s supreme court. Although the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that the predictive method follows from Erie,177 it did 
not take into account state law on the matter. What if the state 
supreme court does not care if federal courts use the predictive 
method concerning its unsettled law? What if it considers the 
method for interpreting its unsettled law to be a procedural 
question that can be answered by federal courts as they see fit? 
Wouldn’t this mean that, with respect to that state’s unsettled 
law, the use of the predictive method is not a matter of consti-
tutional concern?178 
 
 176. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 249 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); King v. Or-
der of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948); see also 
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4501 (2d ed. 1996); Dorf, supra note 86, at 705–06. For a discus-
sion of some of the nuances of the predictive method, see Bradford R. Clark, 
Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federal-
ism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495–517 (1997). 
 177. Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465 (noting that the predictive method “is but an 
application of the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . where state law as an-
nounced by the highest court of the State is to be followed”). 
 178. In Prediction and the Rule of Law, Michael Dorf entertains the possi-
bility that the interpretation of state law by federal courts might be deter-
mined by state law and thus that the appropriateness of the predictive method 
might depend upon the state whose law is being interpreted. Dorf, supra note 
86, at 710–14. But Dorf considers only the possibility that a federal court 
might look to a state’s approach to the interpretation of unsettled state law 
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This puzzle, although similar to our first, is even more 
pressing, because the courts of many states—not just a single 
outlier like Georgia—appear to believe that the predictive 
method need not be used by sister-state or federal courts to de-
cide unsettled questions of their law. Once again, the evidence 
is the way these states treat the unsettled law of sister states.  
Many states take the position expressed in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws. How a state court ascertains 
the content of sister-state law is treated by the Restatement as 
an evidentiary or procedural issue that can be decided as the 
forum sees fit, in accordance with its own law.179 Probably be-
cause it is the easiest method when evidence of sister-state law 
is insufficient, the Restatement recommends that the forum 
presume in such cases that the law of the sister state is the 
same as its own.180 Some states that have adopted this pre-
sumption are Illinois,181 New York,182 Maine,183 and Ne-
 
within the state’s own lower courts. Thus, he suggests that a federal court 
might be obligated under Erie to use the predictive method concerning New 
York law if lower New York courts also decided cases on the basis of predic-
tions of the New York Court of Appeals’s likely decision. Id. at 714. In the end, 
he concludes that relations between a state’s lower courts and its highest court 
of appeals are irrelevant to how a federal court should decide in a diversity 
case, “because the federal court sitting in diversity does not see itself any-
where within the state court hierarchy.” Id. But Dorf ignores the possibility 
that New York might have principles for how federal (or sister-state) courts 
should interpret New York law. Under New York law a federal court deciding 
an unsettled issue of New York law might be freed of any duty to predict the 
New York Court of Appeals’s decision. That is the puzzle we are now facing.  
 179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136(2) (1969).  
 180. Id. § 136 cmt. h. The presumption should not be applied, however, 
“when to do so would not meet the needs of the case or would not be in the in-
terests of justice,” for example, when the expectations of the parties would be 
frustrated. Id. The obligation to respect the expectations of the parties is 
weaker than the predictive method, however. A federal court sitting in diversi-
ty has an obligation to decide as it predicts the relevant state supreme court 
would even when the parties did not rely on the state supreme court’s likely 
decision. The obligation to interpret state law with fidelity is one to the state 
itself, not to the parties.  
 181. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1254 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005); Soc’y 
of Mount Carmel v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co. of Ill., 643 N.E.2d 1280, 1293 
n.4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Ellerbrake v. Campbell-Hausfeld, No. 01L 540, 2003 
WL 23409813, at *2 (Ill. Cir. July 2, 2003). 
 182. Knieriemen v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 
(App. Div. 1980); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Calhoon, 270 N.Y.S.2d 691, 696 (Sup. 
Ct. 1966). But see Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding 
ambiguity as to whether the presumption is still in place under New York law). 
 183. ROC-Century Assocs. v. Giunta, 658 A.2d 223, 226 (Me. 1995). 
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braska.184 
Such a presumption is incompatible with the predictive 
method. Under the predictive method, a federal court faced 
with inadequate evidence of state law remains obligated to 
predict how the state’s supreme court would decide.185 It may 
not presume that unsettled state law is the same as federal 
law. To be sure, a federal court may look to any relevant deci-
sions of federal courts, as well as the courts of sister states, as 
evidence of the state supreme court’s likely decision.186 But 
similarity to federal law is not presumed, because federal deci-
sions are irrelevant when federal courts take a minority ap-
proach to the issue or the general assumptions standing behind 
them are different from those of the state whose law the federal 
court is interpreting. 
The presumption of similarity to forum law can be signifi-
cant for certifying nationwide class actions. Those seeking to 
certify the class bear the burden of showing that questions of 
law and fact common to the class predominate over questions 
affecting the individual members.187 If the plaintiffs have caus-
es of action that arise under a number of states’ laws, the dif-
ference between these laws can frustrate certification.188 But if 
the presumption is used, it will be the defendant who must 
show that the sister states’ laws differ from the law of the for-
um. When sister states’ laws are unsettled, she will not be able 
to overcome the presumption, making class certification easi-
er.189  
Whether a state employs the presumption is often evident, 
therefore, in the way it approaches certification. For example, 
Texas had a tradition of assigning to the defendant the burden 
of showing that the various state laws applying to the members 
 
 184. Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 439 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Neb. 1989). 
 185. The types of evidence a court should use is catalogued in McKenna v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980).  
 186. Id. 
 187. E.g., Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action 
Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1740 (2006). 
 188. E.g., Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class 
Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002–05 (2008). 
 189. For a discussion of the use of the presumption in class action certifica-
tion, including when these actions are brought in federal court, see Green, su-
pra note 63, at pt. III.C; Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law as an Impedi-
ment to Certifying a National Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 893 (2005); 
Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class 
Suits Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(B)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 799, 801–17; Woolley, supra note 187, at 1740. 
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of the plaintiff class were different from forum law.190 But re-
cently the Texas Supreme Court held that the burden is on the 
class proponent to show that state laws are not different.191 
This suggests that Texas does not employ a presumption of 
similarity to forum law.  
As we saw in connection with Slaton, the way a state court 
interprets the law of sister states is evidence of how it believes 
its own law should or may be interpreted. This is particularly 
true when its interpretive approach is applied to all sister 
states, without sensitivity to how sister states’ courts them-
selves wish their law to be interpreted. When the Georgia Su-
preme Court held in Slaton that Alabama common law may be 
interpreted without deference to the decisions of the Alabama 
Supreme Court, it did not look to particular Alabama decisions 
that suggested that a lack of deference was what the Alabama 
Supreme Court wanted. Its reasoning was instead applicable to 
the common law of all states—including Georgia.  
Accordingly, the fact that Texas courts refuse to employ the 
presumption of similarity to forum law concerning unsettled 
sister-state law suggests that they think that sister-state and 
federal courts should not use the presumption concerning un-
settled Texas law. By the same token, New York courts must 
think that their unsettled law may be interpreted in accordance 
with the presumption. And this generates our puzzle. If New 
York courts do not care whether unsettled New York law is in-
terpreted using the predictive method, on what grounds can the 
Supreme Court claim that federal courts are constitutionally 
obligated to interpret New York law according to this method?  
Of course, even if our puzzle is set aside, there are consid-
erable doubts about whether the predictive method is required 
by Erie. Under the predictive method, a federal district court 
interpreting unsettled state law does not mimic how a trial 
court in the state would decide the matter. Instead, it seeks to 
duplicate how the issue would have been decided in the state 
court system as a whole, with the possibility of appeal. Assume, 
for example, that the state supreme court issued a decision on 
 
 190. Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 613 (Tex. App. 6th 1995); 
Osborn v. Kinnington, 787 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App. 8th 1990). 
 191. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 673 (Tex. 2004) 
(“As ‘guardian[s] of absent claimants’ rights, courts have an independent duty 
to determine uniformity [of various states’ laws] sua sponte, even if neither 
party raises it.’” (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 954 
(Tex. 1996))). The Montana Supreme Court came to the same conclusion. See 
Sieglock v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 81 P.3d 495, 499 (Mont. 2003). 
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point long ago that it would likely overrule if it took the case on 
appeal now. In general, a state trial court must apply the old 
decision. It is not permitted to apply the rule that it predicts 
the state supreme court would use now.192 If a federal court 
adopted the trial court’s perspective, the rule it applied could 
seriously diverge from the rule that would be applied in the 
state court system as a whole. It is for this reason that the pre-
dictive method looks to the state supreme court’s likely deci-
sion. 
But the predictive method can fail to track how the case 
would turn out in the state court system as well. After, all, the 
trial court’s decision might not have been appealed to the state 
supreme court. Or, if appeal had been sought, the state su-
preme court, although strongly inclined to overrule its old deci-
sion, might not have granted appeal at that moment.193 
I do not take a stand here on whether the predictive meth-
od is the best way of satisfying Erie. Perhaps things would be 
better if a federal court were required to act like a state trial 
court.194 Or maybe federal courts should always abstain from 
hearing actions with unsettled questions of state law,195 or 
should always certify such questions to the state’s supreme 
court.196 
 
 192. E.g., Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 427 A.2d 1121, 1129 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Himes v. Stalker, 416 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
Lower federal courts are likewise bound by old Supreme Court decisions, even 
if they predict that the U.S. Supreme Court would decide differently now. 
Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (“We 
have been told by our judicial superiors not to read the sibylline leaves of the 
U.S. Reports for prophetic clues to overruling.”), vacated, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).  
 193. E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601 (McKinney 1995) (granting the right of ap-
peal only in a narrow set of cases). 
 194. This was arguably the approach that the Supreme Court originally 
took to the matter. See Stoner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467 (1940); 
West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1940); Six Cos. Of Cal. v. 
Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co. v. 
Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940). 
 195. The Supreme Court has held, however, that a federal court may not 
abstain from hearing a case over which it has federal jurisdiction simply be-
cause an issue of state law is unsettled. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 
U.S. 228, 234 (1943). 
 196. Clark, supra note 176, at 1544–63. Indeed, it might even be better if 
federal courts decided on the basis of principles latent in state decisions, even 
if they believed that the state supreme court would not be true to these prin-
ciples if it decided the case. E.g., Dorf, supra note 86, at 695–715; Robert A. 
Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1423–31 (2005). 
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But all the alternatives that have been offered share with 
the predictive method the view that a federal court’s interpre-
tation of unsettled state law is a matter of constitutional con-
cern. The alternative approaches are recommended because 
they are thought to do the best job of satisfying a federal court’s 
duty under Erie.197 No one considers the proper interpretive 
method to be a purely procedural or evidentiary matter con-
cerning which federal courts are free to adopt any approach 
they like. And yet that is precisely how many states see the 
matter. Given that these states have sought to free federal 
courts of any obligation to use the interpretive method recom-
mended under Erie (which I will now assume, for simplicity of 
argument, is the predictive method), why do federal courts 
refuse to consider themselves free?  
B. NONDISCRIMINATION, AGAIN 
We are now in a position to solve this puzzle. There are on-
ly two ways that a federal court can be free of a constitutional 
duty to use the predictive method. The first is if the method for 
interpreting a state’s unsettled law is constitutionally proce-
dural—it is, to use Justice Brennan’s language in Byrd, not 
“bound up” with state rights and obligations. If that is the case, 
however, the Supreme Court has been wrong to consider the 
predictive method a matter of constitutional concern. Federal 
courts are in fact constitutionally free to adopt any method of 
interpreting unsettled state law they see fit.198 They could, for 
example, presume that unsettled state law is the same as fed-
eral law.  
On the other hand, let us assume that the method for in-
terpreting a state’s unsettled law is constitutionally substan-
tive—it is “bound up” with state rights and obligations.199 If 
 
 197. E.g., Clark, supra note 176, at 1564; Dorf, supra note 86, at 710–15. 
 198. Their choice would, however, be subject to the nonconstitutional Erie 
doctrine. They might be required to choose the method that the courts of the 
state where they are located use for interpreting unsettled sister-state law, in 
order to avoid forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws. 
See Green, supra note 63, at pt. IV; supra note 64.  
 199. In an important new article, Abbe Gluck has recently argued that 
rules of statutory interpretation should be subject to Erie. Abbe R. Gluck, In-
tersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as ‘Law’ and the Erie Doc-
trine, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011). Although she does not distinguish be-
tween the constitutional and the nonconstitutional Erie doctrines, see supra 
note 64, her argument lends support to the notion that rules of statutory in-
terpretation are constitutionally substantive, that is, bound up with state 
rights and obligations. If so, not only would a federal court in New York inter-
  
2011] ERIE’S SUPPRESSED PREMISE 1161 
 
this is so, a state supreme court might still be able to give fed-
eral courts the freedom to come up with their own method of in-
terpreting the state’s unsettled law, for example, if it under-
stood the appropriate method as a factual question to be 
decided by each court. But our nondiscrimination principle 
would apply. If the matter is factual for federal courts, it must 
be factual for the state’s trial courts as well.  
For example, to permit federal courts to come up with their 
own method of interpreting unsettled New York law, the New 
York Court of Appeals would have to permit New York trial 
courts to come up with their own methods as well.200 Since no 
state has ever given their trial courts such freedom, it is un-
derstandable that the Supreme Court has recommended a uni-
form approach to the interpretation of unsettled issues of state 
law, without considering state law on the matter. 
The same argument applies horizontally. The Full Faith 
and Credit Clause forbids a state supreme court from freeing 
sister-state courts of their duty to interpret its unsettled law 
according to the predictive method—except through inconceiv-
able changes in the way its unsettled law is treated in its own 
courts. Sister states must use the predictive method concerning 
a state’s unsettled law, whatever the state itself might say 
about the matter.201 
 
preting a Pennsylvania statute have a constitutional obligation to use Penn-
sylvania’s rules for statutory interpretation, Pennsylvania would be prohibited 
from freeing the federal court of this obligation.  
 200. Furthermore, the individualized decision of the New York state trial 
court would have to not be subject to appeal—or at least de novo appeal—in 
that system. See supra note 155. 
 201. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the Supreme Court held that even when 
sister-state courts are constitutionally obligated to apply a state’s law, they 
may adopt any interpretation of the state’s law that they wish, provided that 
the interpretation does not “contradict law of the other State that is clearly 
established and that has been brought to the court’s attention.” 486 U.S. 717, 
731 (1988). This means that sister-state courts are not obligated to use the 
predictive method concerning unsettled state law and indeed can presume 
that this law is the same as their own. In Green, supra note 63, at pt. II.C, I 
argue that the Court conflated the interpretive duties of sister-state courts 
under full faith and credit with the circumstances under which the Supreme 
Court would review whether those duties have been violated. In that article, I 
did not consider our puzzle, however. What difference would it make to the 
sister-state courts’ duties if the state whose unsettled law was being inter-
preted did not care whether its law was interpreted according to the predictive 
method? In this Article, I fill that gap.  
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IV.  CHOICE OF LAW   
In this Article, I have used the nondiscrimination prin-
ciples latent in Erie and the Full Faith and Credit Clause pri-
marily to put established areas of the law, such as the predic-
tive method, on a firmer and more intellectually satisfying 
footing. I want to end with a brief suggestion that the prin-
ciples might compel radical changes to another area: choice of 
law. 
Assume that a Vermont state court is entertaining a negli-
gence action brought by a wife against her husband concerning 
an accident in Pennsylvania. The couple is domiciled in New 
York. New York law allows interspousal suits, but Pennsylva-
nia prohibits them unless the defendant was reckless (some-
thing not alleged in the wife’s complaint). Which state’s law 
should the Vermont court apply? This problem is usually con-
ceived as one to be answered by Vermont’s choice-of-law rules. 
Since the question is whether Pennsylvania or New York law 
should be chosen, it cannot be answered by the law of Pennsyl-
vania or New York.  
But this is a mistake. The question is not yet whether 
Pennsylvania or New York law should be chosen. There is no 
choice to make if one of the state’s laws does not apply to the 
facts, for example, if Pennsylvania’s prohibition on interspousal 
suits does not apply to non-Pennsylvanians who get in acci-
dents in the state. And how is this question to be answered ex-
cept by looking to the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court?202 Isn’t the scope of Pennsylvania law whatever the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would say it is? Wouldn’t the 
Vermont court be violating its obligations under full faith and 
credit if it held that Pennsylvania law applies when the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court would not? 
One way of putting this point is that the choice-of-law rules 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would use to determine 
whether Pennsylvania law applies can be constitutionally sub-
stantive, in the sense that they define the scope of Pennsylva-
 
 202. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 569–74 (1996); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 303 (1990); Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1005–08 (1991) [hereinafter Kramer, Renvoi]; Roosevelt, 
supra note 112, at 1884. For older examples, see JOHN WESTLAKE, A TREATISE 
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 25–41 (5th ed. 1912); Erwin N. Griswold, 
Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1186–87 (1938). 
  
2011] ERIE’S SUPPRESSED PREMISE 1163 
 
nia law.203 If Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules are bound up 
with the state’s rights and obligations, it follows that the Ver-
mont court cannot use Vermont choice-of-law rules when decid-
ing whether Pennsylvania law applies. It must use the rules 
that would be used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  
And yet every choice-of-law method used by state courts—
from the traditional approach, as exemplified in the First Re-
statement, to more modern interest-analysis approaches—
refuses to defer to a sister state’s supreme court when deter-
mining whether the sister state’s law may be applied to interju-
risdictional facts. Consider the traditional approach, which em-
ploys fairly rigid rules that select a state’s law on the basis of 
whether a localizing event occurred within that state. It would 
recommend Pennsylvania law, because the lex loci delicti—or 
law of the place of the harm—applies in tort cases.204 If our 
Vermont court used the First Restatement, it would choose 
Pennsylvania law even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, us-
ing a method different from the First Restatement or disagree-
ing about whether the case should be characterized as tort, 
would hold that Pennsylvania’s prohibition on interspousal 
immunity does not apply to non-Pennsylvanians who get into 
accidents in the state.205 
Modern interest analysis suffers from the same problem. 
Although it can take a variety of forms—from the classical in-
terest-analysis approach of Brainerd Currie,206 to the Second 
 
 203. Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 202, at 1043–44; Roosevelt, supra note 112, 
at 1883. 
 204. States still using the traditional lex loci delicti rule for torts are Ala-
bama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of 
Law in American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 269, 279–80 (2009).  
 205. An example of such a case is Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113, 113–14 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1986). The Court of Appeals of Georgia applied Florida inter-
spousal immunity law to a Georgia couple who got into an accident in Florida. 
Id. It did not consider the fact that two years earlier a Florida court, using 
Florida’s modern interest analysis approach, had held that its interspousal 
immunity law does not apply to non-Floridians who get into accidents in Flor-
ida. Pennington v. Dye, 456 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).  
Indeed, the First Restatement is explicit that the choice-of-law rules of 
foreign jurisdictions should be ignored by the forum, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934), making an exception only in cases of title to 
land and the validity of a decree of divorce. Id. § 8. In these two situations, the 
doctrine of renvoi is used. See infra note 212. 
 206. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(1963). No state explicitly adopts all of Currie’s approach, although all modern 
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Restatement,207 to Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations,208 
to Baxter’s comparative impairment209—all modern approaches 
take seriously the idea of looking to the purposes standing be-
hind a state’s law when determining whether it applies to a 
transaction that crosses state borders. If Vermont used a mod-
ern approach, it would likely claim that the purposes of Penn-
sylvania’s interspousal immunity law—such as encouraging 
marital concord and preventing collusive suits between spouses 
to collect insurance proceeds—would not be implicated concern-
ing non-Pennsylvania couples. For this reason, it would con-
clude that Pennsylvania law does not apply, even if the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, using the First Restatement, would 
have applied Pennsylvania law to the facts.210 
Although for at least a century a minority of choice-of-law 
scholars has argued that some choice-of-law rules should be 
treated as substantive,211 recently the position has gained mo-
mentum.212 What is distinctive about contemporary propo-
 
approaches are heavily influenced by it. Symeonides, supra note 204, at 278–80. 
 207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969). This is the 
most prevalent approach, used by at least twenty-two states for torts. Syme-
onides, supra note 204, at 279–80. 
 208. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 
41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966). This approach (also 
known as the “better law” approach) is used by Arkansas, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin for torts. Symeonides, supra note 
204, at 279–80. 
 209. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1963). Baxter’s approach is arguably used in California. Symeonides, 
supra note 204, at 279; see also Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 721–
24 (Cal. 1976). 
 210. An example from a contract case is Dillard v. Shaughnessy, Fickel & 
Scott Architects, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The Missouri Court 
of Appeals, using the Second Restatement, applied Kansas law to interpret a 
contract entered into in Missouri, on the ground that the subject matter of the 
contract was a building project in Kansas. Id. at 715–19. But Kansas state 
courts accept the traditional view that the law of the place of contracting con-
trols. A Kansas court, therefore, would have held that Kansas law does not 
apply. Once again, this fact was considered irrelevant. 
 211. E.g., WESTLAKE, supra note 202, at 34; Griswold, supra note 202, at 
1186–87. For a meticulous discussion of older cases pro and con, see JOHN 
PAWLEY BATE, NOTES ON THE DOCTRINE OF RENVOI IN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1904). 
 212. Discussion of this issue has largely occurred in the context of the so-
called renvoi problem in choice of law. But renvoi in fact addresses a different 
issue. Renvoi had its origin in the traditional approach. To see how it was 
supposed to work, consider Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113, 113–14 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1986), in which a Georgia court, using the traditional approach, con-
cluded that Florida law on interspousal immunity applied to a Georgia couple 
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nents—such as Lea Brilmayer, Larry Kramer, and Kermit Roo-
sevelt—is that they emphasize the Swiftian nature of prevail-
ing choice-of-law approaches,213 and recommend their reforma-
tion in the spirit of Erie (sometimes via the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause).214 
But their Erie lacks the suppressed premise. The goal is to 
show respect for a state supreme court’s views about the terri-
torial scope of its law.215 And if respect is all that is at issue, no 
reform in choice of law is needed. A state supreme court’s 
choice-of-law decisions can be ignored for the simple reason 
that it thinks they can be ignored. After all, that is precisely 
what it does concerning the choice-of-law decisions of sister 
states. 
Consider, once again, Georgia’s Swiftian approach to the 
common law. Georgia courts ignore sister-state decisions when 
deciding what the common law in those sister states is. From 
this it followed that they think their own decisions concerning 
 
who got into an accident in Florida. Renvoi begins with a fundamental ques-
tion: What is meant by “Florida law”? Florida’s law prohibiting interspousal 
suits (the “internal” law of Florida)? Or the law that Florida courts would ap-
ply (the “total” law of Florida)? If it is the latter and Florida courts, using a 
modern choice-of-law approach, would say that Georgia law applies, then ap-
plying “Florida law” would mean applying Georgia law (whether internal or 
total). This is the renvoi (“sending back” or “sending away” in French). Kra-
mer, Renvoi, supra note 202, at 980 n.3.  
With a small number of limited exceptions, the traditional approach re-
jected renvoi. If the forum’s choice-of-law rules say Florida law applies, Flori-
da’s internal law is chosen, not the law that Florida courts would apply. 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7–8 (1934). On the one hand, 
this is a violation of the obligation to respect a state court’s views concerning 
the scope of its law. The forum will apply Florida law even when a Florida 
court would not. But it is not necessary to adopt renvoi to respect Florida deci-
sions concerning the scope of Florida law. Respecting Florida decisions means 
taking Florida courts’ application of Georgia law to mean that Florida law does 
not apply. Under the doctrine of renvoi, their application of Georgia law is taken 
to mean that Georgia law applies. That is a matter for Georgia courts to decide. 
 213. E.g., Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A 
Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555, 563 (1984); Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 
202, at 986–87; Roosevelt, supra note 112, at 1840–41, 1863–64, 1889–90. 
 214. Lea Brilmayer, The Problem of Provenance: Constructing a Positive Law 
Foundation for Choice of Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Donald Earl Childress III ed., forthcoming); Roosevelt, supra note 112, at 1841. 
 215. Kramer and Roosevelt, for example, both draw distinctions between 
when the sister state’s courts wish their choice-of-law decisions to bind the fo-
rum and when they do not. Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 202, at 1028–53; Roo-
sevelt, supra note 112, at 1869–87. They do not always agree on the particu-
lars. Id. at 1878–84 (disagreeing with Kramer’s interpretation of the First 
Restatement). But they both ignore the evidence provided by the way the sis-
ter state’s courts treat the choice-of-law decisions of other states.  
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Georgia common law can be ignored by sister-state courts. As 
far as choice of law is concerned, every state is Georgia. Wheth-
er it uses the First Restatement or a modern approach, every 
state court thinks it can ignore sister-state decisions when de-
termining the territorial scope of sister-state law. From this it 
follows that every state court thinks its own decisions can be 
ignored by sister states. 
That state courts do not care if their choice-of-law decisions 
are followed is, I believe, the fundamental reason that the 
Brilmayer-Kramer-Roosevelt position has always been in the 
minority.216 It is no help for them to argue that the majority 
approach fails to recognize that a state’s choice-of-law rules can 
be substantive.217 Even if that is so, the question remains 
whether they are binding on sister-state and federal courts. 
Since the state’s own courts do not think they are binding, it 
seems disrespectful to disagree. 
Things would come to a head if a courageous state gave up 
its Swiftian approach to choice of law and demanded that sis-
ter-state and federal courts respect some or all of its choice-of-
law rules when determining the territorial scope of its law. But 
since no state has taken this stand,218 Erie and full faith and 
credit—understood as commanding respect for state courts’ 
views about their law—are trivially satisfied. 
The matter is different, however, if Erie and full faith and 
credit include our nondiscrimination principles. A state would 
no longer be permitted to designate its substantive choice-of-
 
 216. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 97 (1991) (“If choice of law is assumed to be superlaw, 
distinct from the substantive law on which the individual states are free to dif-
fer, then there is some sense in saying that the forum will defer to the other 
state on matters of substantive law but not on the proper application of choice 
of law rules.”); Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of 
Laws—Meaning of “The Law of a Country,” 27 YALE L.J. 509, 517–18 (1918) 
(arguing that nations do not consider their choice-of-law rules to be binding 
upon foreign courts). 
 217. Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 202, at 1043–44; Roosevelt, supra note 
112, at 1861–64. 
 218. The only time this is done, which itself evokes Swift v. Tyson, is when 
the territorial scope of a state’s statute is specified in the statute itself. Roose-
velt, supra note 112, at 1858. An example would be a Pennsylvania inter-
spousal immunity statute that limits its application to “Pennsylvania domicil-
iaries.” Id. A Vermont court would respect such a limitation, even when its 
own choice-of-law rules would have come to a different conclusion about the 
statute’s territorial scope.  
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law rules as binding upon local courts but not upon the courts 
of other sovereigns.219  
  CONCLUSION   
The Erie doctrine is commonly viewed as a limit on the 
power of federal courts. And that is indeed its primary function. 
Under Erie, federal courts must defer to state supreme court 
decisions when interpreting a state’s law. The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause puts a similar obligation on sister-state courts. 
By granting state supreme courts this power over other Ameri-
can courts the Constitution creates a unified legal system. 
But this power also carries with it a duty. A state supreme 
court may not undermine the legal uniformity demanded by 
Erie and the Full Faith and Credit Clause by varying the legal 
effect of its decisions on the basis of the jurisdiction of the rec-
ognizing court. If its decisions—including its choice-of-law deci-
sions—are binding on domestic courts, they must be binding 
throughout the American legal system. Nor can it release other 
American courts of the duty to interpret its unsettled law with 
fidelity. Since the courts of its own state must interpret its un-
settled law with fidelity, so must federal and sister-state 
courts. That is the price of the power it enjoys as a participant 
in the American legal system. That it must pay this price is the 
hidden lesson of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 
 
 219. What choice of law would look like as a result cannot be explored fur-
ther here. I hope to discuss the matter in a later article. 
